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Volume 48 WINTER 1973 Number 2
WIRED FOR COLLYER: RATIONALIZING NLRB AND
ARBITRATION JURISDICTION
MICHAEL J. ZIMMERt
In Collyer Insulated Wire' the National Labor Relations Board
held that rather than deciding whether changes in working conditions
made by an employer during the term of a collective bargaining agree-
ment violated § 8(a)(5)2 of the National Labor Relations Act,' the
Board would defer to an arbitrator. In the past, the Board has occasion-
ally couched the rationale for its decisions in terms of deferral. There-
fore, the major question presented is whether Collyer is another random
deferral case or whether it signifies a major change towards a general
and predictable policy of deferral.
The National Labor Relations Board is well known for its ad hoc
use of precedent." Therefore, reliance on a single NLRB decision as an
* My special thanks to my colleague, Bill Toal, and to Craig K. Davis, a third-year
student in the University of South Carolina School of Law, who served as my research
assistant.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (Aug. 20, 1971).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (5) (1970) (employer refusal to bargain collectively made
an unfair labor practice).
3. Id. §§ 151-68 [hereinafter referred to as NLRA].
4. There are various institutional and structural explanations for the Board's
failure to follow precedent. All Board action initiates at the regional level, with the re-
gions answerable to the General Counsel and ultimately to the Board. Although the
Board may review a regional director's refusal to proceed, there appears to be no judicial
review of the General Counsel's decision not to proceed. Amalgamated Street, Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 305 n.2 (1971) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) ; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) ; United Elec. Contractors Ass'n. v.
Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967). But cf. Les-
nick, Preemption Reconsidered: the Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 CoLum. L.
Ray. 469, 483 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Lesnick]. While the General Counsel and
regional directors are theoretically bound by precedent, the criteria used in a decision not
to proceed were unavailable to the public until very recently. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1972). Cases that go to a hearing are decided by
trial examiners who, while bound by Board precedent, act independently of the NLRB.
29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1970). Rulings are reviewed at the Board level, but NLRB review
procedures contribute even more to the ad hoo treatment of precedent. If one of a
Board member's legal assistants deems a case clear cut, a decision is drafted for approval
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announcement of a general policy is risky. However, the decision in
Collyer, announcing a new "developmental step" toward increasing
deferral to arbitration' may merit such reliance and is worth examining
for three reasons. First, Board members have given sufficient fanfare
to Collyer to indicate that the decision may be taken seriously.' Second,
General Counsel Peter G. Nash has made public his memorandum to
regional directors indicating how Collyer should be implemented,' which
is an opening into the bureaucratic process that may prove insightful.
Third, the Board has developed the Collyer doctrine in subsequent cases
in a manner showing remarkable control and concern for consistency.'
THE BACKDROP OF THE SUPREME COURT
Courts and Arbitration
The start of any analysis of the role of arbitration in collective
bargaining is Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.9 In a § 30110
action to order arbitration, the Supreme Court rejected the common law
rule against enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate, created a
by a panel of three Board members. Only the most important cases are discussed by
the whole Board. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 820-22 (C. Morris ed. 1971) [herein-
after cited as DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. See also Toward an Improved Labor judiciary,
NLRB Press Release, No. R-1230 (May 26, 1972) (Chairman Miller).
A more pragmatic reason for the Board's cavalier treatment of precedent may be
found in the nature of the problems before the NLRB. Behavioral decisions must be
made on the basis of little data. Conclusions concerning the coercive impact of speech
or bad faith bargaining must of necessity be ad hoc based on seat of the pants judg-
ments. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Getman,
Goldberg & Herman, The National Labor Relations Board Voting Study: A Preliminary
Report, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 233 (1972).
5. 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
6. See Address by Member Fanning, The Impact of Collyer on Arbitration, Eighth
Annual Labor Management Conference on Collective Bargaining and Labor Law, Tuc-
son, Arizona, Feb. 5, 1972; Address by Member Miller, A Case Story, Western State
Employer Association Conference, Pebble Beach, California, Aug. 27, 1971; Address by
Member Miller, The N.L.R.B. Past, Present and Future, Bar Association of New York.
Nov. 12, 1970.
7. P. Nash, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer, Feb. 28, 1972, reprinted in
CCH LAB. L. REP. 9,002, at 15,013 (NLRB General Counsel Memorandum to all re-
gional directors, officers-in-charge and resident officers) [hereinafter cited as Collyer
memoradum].
8. See text accompanying notes 165-266 infra.
9. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
10. Section 301 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
29 U.S.C. § 195(a) (1970).
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federal law of collective bargaining to be fashioned "from the policy of
ur national labor laws,"" and ordered arbitration. This case set the stage
for a rapid legalization and federalization of arbitration as a means of re-
solving disputes arising during the term of collective bargaining agree-
ments. As a result of the flowering of this new forum for conflict resolution
in the employment sector, many questions arose concerning the relationship
of arbitration to other existing forums. One of the first questions was
whether courts or arbitrators determine whether a collective bargaining
agreement providing for arbitration is binding on an employer. In John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,2 an employer, Interscience, had an agreement
with a union that included an arbitration provision, but the agreement had
no provision binding successor employers. When Interscience merged
with Wiley, the union brought suit for arbitration. The Supreme Court,
per justice Harlan, ruled that in § 301 suits, the proper function of
the court is to determine if the employer is bound by the collective bar-
gaining agreement:
The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory
submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination
that the collective bargaining agreement does in fact create such
a duty.'
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,'4 one of
the famed Steelworkers Trilogy, an employee was off work due to
an industrial injury for which he received a workmen's compensation
settlement based on a 25 per cent permanent partial disability. He filed a
grievance, and the union sought arbitration to have him reinstated in his
old job. The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the
employer holding the grievance was a "frivolous, patently baseless one,
not subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement."'"
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that it was not the proper function of courts to determine whether the
claimed contract right was reasonable, meritorious, or related to a specific
provision in the written agreement. Rather a court should be
confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration
is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract.
Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of
contract interpretation for the arbitrator.
11. 353 U.s. at 456.
12. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
13. Id. at 547.
14. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
15. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959).
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The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits
of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a par-
ticular claim, or determining whether there is particular lan-
guage in the written instrument which will support the claim.
The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not
merely those which the court will deem meritorious. The pro-
cessing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of
which those who are not a part of the plant environment may be
quite unaware."
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,"' the
contract excluded from arbitration "matters which are strictly a function
of management."" The union sought arbitration challenging the sub-
contracting of work formerly done by unit employees. The district court
dismissed the case, holding that contracting out was strictly a function of
management and was, therefore, not arbitrable."9 The court of appeals
affirmed.2" The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that courts
should resolve questions of interpretation of the arbitration clause by
applying a strong presumption of arbitrability. Here the exclusion clause
did not explicitly exclude subcontracting or contracting out, so the judg-
ment whether contracting out is strictly a management function should be
made by an arbitrator, rather than the court:
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular
grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful
evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can
prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague
and the arbitration clause quite broad.2
The objective of national labor policy which is central to the Court's
favoring of labor arbitration over judicial process may be summed up in
one phrase from Warrior & Gulf, "arbitration is the substitute for in-
16. 363 U.S. at 568.
17. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
18. Id. at 576.
19. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 168 F. Supp. 702, 705
(S.D. Ala. 1958).
20. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 269 F.2d 633 (5th
Cir. 1959).
21. 363 U.S. at 584-85. See Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Pre-
snmption of Arbitrability, 85 HAIv. L. REv. 636 (1972), which calls for closer court scru-
tiny of arbitrability where the employer seeks an injunction against a strike in violation
of a no-strike clause. See also Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 446 F.2d 1157 (3d
Cir. 1972) (refusal to order arbitration or enjoin a strike over alleged mine safety vio-
lations despite a no-strike clause).
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dustrial strife."22 The central nature of this judgment is shown in Local
174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,2" where the Court incorporated, as
a matter of law, an implied no-strike clause in every collective bargaininy
agreement that provided for arbitration but did not include a no-strike
clause. This implied clause is coextensive with the scope of the arbitration
provision and, presumably, is the basis for a federal or state court in-
junction should a strike occur over a dispute that could be submitted to
arbitration.2 The incorporation of a no-strike clause into the collective
bargaining agreement undermines or at least alters the bargain struck by
the parties, implying that industrial peace takes precedence over collective
bargaining.
One recent case seems to step back a bit from the strong presumption
of arbitrability. In Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson,25 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether employees with Fair Labor
Standards Act claims must exhaust contract remedies before bringing
federal suit. In a per curiam opinion issued after oral arguments, the
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted
on the ground that the arbitration provision was so narrow that the em-
ployees had no contractual remedies to which they could resort.26 Al-
though the Iowa Supreme Court had held that the controversy was
"undoubtedly arbitrable, '1 27 the United States Supreme Court found that
the claim of the employees was not arbitrable since the contract limited
arbitration to grievances "pertaining to a violation of the Agreement."28
Justice Douglas dissented because the holding questioned the continued
22. 363 U.S. at 578. Implicit in the Trilogy is the judgment that arbitration is
superior to judicial process in the settlement of employment disputes. The parties trust
an arbitrator because they are allowed to decide how the arbitrator is chosen, who he or
she is, and the rules under which the decision will be made. See Bond, The Concurrence
Conundrutm: The Overlapping Jurisdiction of Arbitration and the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 42 S. CAr.. L. Rav. 4, 12-1S (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bond]. If the
parties are dissatisfied with the results, they may bargain for new rules or select arbi-
trators more carefully in the future. Another factor is the unique, organic or constitu-
tional character of collective bargaining agreements. Judges, schooled in the traditional
law of contracts, may not be sensitive to the realities of industrial self-government. An
arbitrator, however,
is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the
common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to
bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for
judgment.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
23. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
24. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970).
25. 404 U.S. 820 (1972).
26. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 405 U.S. 228 (1972).
27. Thompson v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 185 N.W. 2d 738, 741 (Iowa 1971).
28. 405 U.S. at 230.
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vitality of the strong presumption of arbitrability established in American
Manufacturing and Warrior & Gulf.29
While it is possible Iowa Beef Packers indicates an anti-arbitration
attitude, it is only a per curiam opinion dismissing certiorari. Further, a
case decided later in the term discounts any anti-arbitration impact of
Iowa Bdef Packers by holding that even such a traditional court doctrine
as laches cannot be interposed to interfere with arbitration."0 Thus, there
seems to be no major shift in attitude toward the Trilogy policy of keeping
courts out of the arbitration process.
The insulation that arbitration enjoys from court decision on the
merits of a dispute is further demonstrated by the standard of review of
arbitration awards in § 301 enforcement actions. In United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,3 a group of employees was discharged
for striking to protest the discharge of another employee. Finding the
employees' action improper but not warranting discharge, the arbitrator
ordered reinstatement even though the contract had expired by the time
the award was rendered. The Supreme Court, again by Justice Douglas,
described the contractual wellspring from which the arbitrator must draw
his powers:
[A] n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this
obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of
the award. 2
29. Id.
30. International Operating Eng'rs Local 150 v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487
(1972). In this case the union brought a § 301 suit for arbitration to enforce a master
contract, claiming that the company had signed a memorandum agreeing to be bound to
any future master contract. The memorandum was signed in 1964 but the union did
nothing to pursue its memorandum rights after a master agreement was signed in 1966
until 1968, just as the master contract was about to expire, when it brought suit.
Though the district court, International Operating Eng'rs Local 150, No. 68-C-2091
(N.D. Ill. April 14, 1969), and circuit court of appeals, International Operating Eng'rs
Local 150, 440 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1971), found the suit barred by laches, the Supreme
Court ordered arbitration. The district court had found the master contract binding
because of the memorandum agreement, and the master agreement provided for arbitra-
tion of "any difference." 406 U.S. at 488, 491. Reasoning that the issue of laches is a
"difference" the Court held that arbitration was necessary. Id. at 491. See also Legion
Utensils Co. v. Trenz, 66 CCH LAB. CAs. 52,666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 16, 1971) (hold-
ing that the issue of res judicata is for the arbitrator and not the court).
31. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
32. Id. at 597.
WIRED FOR COLLYER
However, courts are cautioned not to exercise activism on review:
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration
award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bar-
gaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes
by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on
the merits of the awards. . . [Arbitrators] sit to settle
disputes at the plant level - disputes that require for their
solution knowledge of the custom and practices of a particular
factory or of a particular industry as reflected in particular
agreements. 3
In sum, the Court has required courts to bow out of labor disputes
arising under a collective bargaining agreement except to determine
whether the defendant in a § 301 action is bound by the labor agreement
and whether the dispute is arbitrable-with a strong presumption of ar-
bitrability. In actions to enforce arbitration awards the court must en-
force the award unless it clearly manifests infidelity to the contract. 4
Individual Employees, § 301 Suits and Arbitration
Many questions also arose about the rights of individual members of
bargaining units to bring suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements.
In Smith v. Evening News Association," a member of one union brought
a state court suit after he had been locked out of his job because of a strike
by another union. He claimed that the clause in his contract, prohibiting
discrimination because of union membership, had been violated when the
employer had allowed non-union employees to come to work and be paid
while locking out employees belonging to non-striking unions. The
Supreme Court held that a state court suit for wages (in the form of dam-
ages) is a § 301 action, that state and federal courts have jurisdiction
over such suits even though the conduct concededly was an unfair labor
practice, and that § 301 actions may be brought by individual em-
ployees.36 Since the collective bargaining agreement contained no grie-
vance-arbitration provisions, the Court made no holding on an em-
33. Id. at 596.
34. Some lower courts are developing individual due process in the relatively few
cases where awards have been successfully challenged. In Howerton v. J. Chistenson Co.,
76 L.R.R.M. 2937 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 1971), the court indicated that, where an employee
claimed that the union failed to represent him, it would make a factual inquiry into the
union's good faith and examine the record for any inference of hostility. In Local 13,
Longshoremen v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1971) an arbitrator's
award upholding a local union officer's discharge was set aside after a search of the
record revealed an inference that the international union was hostile to the local officer.
35. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
36. Id. at 200.
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ployee's rights and obligations when provision is made for arbitration.
Justice Black, in dissent, questioned the wisdom of duplicate forums
for decision - the courts and the Board. Apparently anticipating future
cases in which the additional forum of arbitration is available, Black raised
the due process claim affected employees may possess:
Finally, since the Court is deciding that this type of action
can be brought to vindicate workers' rights, I think it should
also decide clearly and unequivocally whether an employee in-
jured by the discrimination of either his employer or his union
can file and prosecute his own lawsuit in his own way. I cannot
believe that Congress intended by the National Labor Relations
Act either as originally passed or as amended by §301 to take
away rights to sue which individuals have freely exercised in
this country at least since the concept of due process of law be-
came recognized as a guiding principle in our jurisprudence.
And surely the Labor Act was not intended to relegate workers
with lawsuits to the status of wards either of companies or of
unions."
The problem of what to do when arbitration procedures are available
but a grieved employee does not use them was faced in Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox.8" A mine closed, and an employee, without any resort
to grievance or arbitration, brought a state court suit for severance pay
due under the contract. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, held
that:
[F]ederal labor policy requires that individual employees
wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the
contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and
union as the mode of redress."9
Justice Black again dissented on due process grounds. His position was
that an employee may not want the union to handle his dispute, may not
37. Id. at 204-05.
38. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
39. Id. at 652 (emphasis in original). One exception is that an employee may bring
suit without exhausting grievance procedures if such efforts would be futile. Zamora v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Sedlarik v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 54 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Imbrunnone v. Chrysler Corp., 336 F. Supp.
1223 (E.D. Mich. 1971) ; Fulsom v. United-Buckingham Freight Lines, Inc., 324 F. Supp.
135 (W.D. Mo. 1970). See also Wagner v. Columbia Hosp. Dist., - Ore. - , 485
P.2d 421 (1971), where a discharged employee sued both her employer and her union.
The defendants sought arbitration but it was held that the employee need not pursue ar-
bitration since the union would be her representative in arbitration and the union had
demanded her discharge for refusing to join the union.
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want the long and discouraging grievance process, and may not want an
arbitrator's decision. While he would follow Textile Worker's Union
v. Lincoln Mills" and hold companies and unions to their agreements to
arbitrate, he felt that such a decision was:
a far cry from saying, as the Court does today, that an ordin-
ary laborer. . . must, if the union's contract with the employer
provides for arbitration of grievances, have the doors of the
courts of his country shut in his face to prevent his suing the
employer to get his own wages for breach of contract."'
After reviewing some reasons an employee might consider arbitration in-
ferior to a court trial,42 he concludes that
an employee is just as capable of trying to enforce payment of
his wages or wage substitutes under a collective bargaining
agreement as his union, and he certainly is more interested in
this effort than any union would likely be.48
Once it was determined that an aggrieved employee would have to
exhaust any contractual remedies providing for arbitration before initiat-
ing a § 301 action, the next question was what could employees do when
the union, which typically controls the decision of what grievances will be
taken to arbitration, settles claims against the interest of some employees.
So far the insulation of arbitration from judicial review has permitted
management and labor to control the grievance process leading up to
arbitration. In Humphrey v. Moore,4" two auto carriers hauled cars from
Ford's Louisville plant. They agreed that one of them would subse-
quently do all the hauling and would acquire operating rights from the
other. The Detroit Joint Conference Committee, made up equally of union
and employer representatives, settled the question of what to do about the
jobs by dovetailing the seniority lists. Based on seniority, most jobs went
to the employees of the company that had sold its rights. The employees
of the acquiring company who were adversely affected brought a state
court suit to enjoin the settlement. The Supreme Court, by Justice White,
40. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
41. 379 U.S. at 664.
42. The reasons suggested by Justice Black include the absence of a jury trial, the
absence of instructions in the law, special evidence rules, no explication of the reasons
for a decision, no requirement that witnesses be sworn, no requirement that records be
complete and the limited nature of judicial review. He did not elaborate the advantages
of arbitration to employers and unions which are not available to employees. For ex-
ample, employees are denied the right to select the arbitrator and the right to determine
the applicable rules, standards and remedies.
43. 379 U.S. at 668.
44. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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found that the employees' action was a § 301 case, but held that the
settlement did not violate the union's duty of fair representation:
[W]e are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining
agent's duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position
contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents nor in
supporting the position of one group of employees against that of
another.45
Due process protections of the employees adversely affected by the settle-
ment were satisfied because they had notice of the hearing and because
three stewards representing them were present and allowed to state their
position at the hearing.
In Vaca v. Sipes," the Court made it clear that unless the employee
can show the union breached its duty of fair representation, he has no re-
course in a § 301 court action against his union or employer. In Vaca
an employee sued his union in state court alleging the union had refused
to take his grievance to arbitration. His grievance was that he had been
wrongly discharged by not being allowed to return to his job after an ill-
ness. In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that a union
breaches its duty of fair representation when its action towards a member
is arbitrary, discriminatory or taken in bad faith.47 While a union may not
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion,
settlement of a grievance short of taking it to arbitration is not
a breach of the duty of fair representation. Thus, a union may "swap"
or trade off grievances as long as its motive is a good faith balancing of
different elements within the union.
Dissenting, Justice Black summarized what he thought was the
wrongful impact of Vaca:
The rule is that before an employee can sue his employer under
§ 301 of the L.M.R.A. for a simple breach of his employment
contract, the employee must prove not only that he attempted to
exhaust his contractual remedies, but that his attempt to exhaust
them was frustrated by "arbitrary, discriminatory, or. . . bad
faith" conduct on the part of his union.4"
Cases since Vaca demonstrate the difficulty employees now face when
45. Id. at 349.
46. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
47. Id. at 190.
48. Id. at 203-04.
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challenging union-employer action under grievance-arbitration proce-
dures."5
In Amalgamated Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees
v. Lockridge,0 the Supreme Court further insulated union-management
control of the grievance-arbitration process from judicial interference.
In September, 1959, Lockridge, a Greyhound bus driver, revoked his pre-
vious authorization for checkoff of union dues. His dues then became
payable directly to the union. Lockridge's failure to pay his October
dues by November 2, resulted in union suspension from membership and
caused Greyhound to remove him from employment pursuant to the union
security provision in the collective bargaining agreement. The union con-
stitutional provision relied upon to suspend Lockridge required that dues
must be paid by the fifteenth of the month in order to continue
the member in good standing. . . and where a member allows
his arrearage. . . to run into the second month before paying
the same, he shall be debarred from benefits for one month after
payment. Where a member allows his arrearage . . . to run
over the last day of the second month without payment, he does
thereby suspend himself from membership. .
The union security clause in the collective bargaining agreement relied on
to discharge Lockridge required employees to "remain members as a con-
dition precedent to continued employment." 2
Lockridge sued the union in an Idaho state court on two counts. The
first claimed that the union acted wantonly, willfully and wrongfully in
causing plaintiff to be deprived of his employment. Count two was based
on a theory that the union had breached a contract implied under Idaho
law between Lockridge and his union, the terms of which were established
by the union constitution and by-laws. The trial court, affirmed by the
Idaho Supreme Court,"3 gave Lockridge a judgment of $32,678.56 against
the union."Despite the language in the complaint and the undercurrent feeling
49. See cases collected in 2 A.B.A. SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONs LAW, 1972 Comt-
=TTmn REPORTS 88-89 [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. REPORT].
50. 403 U.S. 274 (1971). See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1337 (1972) ; Lesnick, supra note 4.
51. 403 U.S. at 278.
52. Id. A comparison of these provisions reveals that both the union and the com-
pany were mistaken in assuming that Lockridge could be suspended before the last day
of the second month. Simply being a member not-in-good-standing is insufficient to jus-
tify discharge under the collective bargaining contract since the union security clause
merely required union membership and not membership in good standing.
53. 93 Idaho 294, 460 P.2d 719 (1969).
54. 403 U.S. at 282.
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that the union was lashing back at Lockridge for revoking his checkoff
authorization, the Supreme Court read the record as including no finding
of fact on union motivation. Rather, Justice Harlan for the majority
held that the state court had decided the case as a simple breach-of-con-
tract action." Based on the rule in San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmonf the Court held that state court jurisdiction of the claim was
pre-empted because the union's conduct was arguably prohibited under §
817 of the NLRA"
The breach-of-contract description is somewhat confusing because
there are two "contracts" involved. The first contract is the collective
bargaining agreement between the union and Greyhound. While it is
not clear from the opinions, presumably this contract provided for ar-
bitration. That being the case, Maddox and Vaca make it clear that the
employee must exhaust his contractual remedies and, even if he did, the
union and employer can be sued in state or federal court under the national
labor law only by a showing that the union breached its duty of fair re-
presentation by arbitrary or bad faith conduct.
According to the Supreme Court, the second contract, the one implied
to exist under state law from the relationship of a member to his union
with the terms established by the union constitution, was the basis of the
decision by the Idaho courts. Unlike the Vaca standard of bad faith con-
duct, a simple mistaken construction, though reasonably made, would sup-
port a finding under Idaho contract law that the union breached its con-
tract with a member. The Court in Lockridge pre-empted this standard
because it was inconsistent with the Vaca requirement. In essence, then,
Lockridge protects the rule in Vaca from intrusion by state courts apply-
ing a standard inconsistent with the national labor policy in § 301. As
a result of Lockridge, the only state or federal court jurisdiction that
remains in employee suits against union and management is where the
employee pleads and proves that the union breached its duty of fair
representation, i.e., that it acted in an arbitrary or bad faith way towards
the aggrieved employee.
Justice Douglas, joined in dissent by Justice Blackmun, rightly
points out that the high standard of proof required to be successful in a
Vaca action leaves employees only one practical recourse: filing § 8
charges against both the employer and union.55  Douglas claims an
NLRB remedy is slow, remote, expensive, and, becauce of the unreview-
55. Id. at 284.
56. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
58. 403 U.S. at 293.
59. Id. at 303.
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able discretion of the General Counsel to decide not to pursue a case, un-
certain. If Collyer becomes a general policy of deferral to arbitration of
charges filed with the NLRB by individuals, the complaints of those
employees will be channelled into the arbitration system. A court review
of their claims would be available only after proof that the union breached
its fair representation duty.
It is likely that the restriction of individual employees' remedies will
be the basis of further due process challenges. In Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad," the duty of fair representation was imposed on
unions because of the immense power over employees incident to their
status of exclusive bargaining representative. Subsequently, in Vaca, the
high standard of proof required to maintain such an action was used as a
bar to protect union and management from employee challenges to their
operation of the grievance-arbitration systems. According employees full
rights of participation in the grievance-arbitration process would require
their access to the kind of control over the process presently shared by
labor with management, i.e., decisions on how an arbitrator is selected,
who he or she is and the rules under which the arbitrator will operate.
Such full participation would seem to clash immediately and violently
with the principle of the exclusive status of the bargaining representative.
Even a less intrusive rule, such as one providing employees access to the
courts under a simple breach of contract standard0' or to compel arbitra-
tion under the rules as laid out in the contract, still offends the exclusive
bargaining principle.
However, the interest of employees affected adversely by union-
company decisions should, at some point, outweigh the desirability of
insulating the process so as to allow some review by another body. A
rule allowing a discharged employee to have a day in court or arbitration
is a comparatively insignificant interference with the exclusive bar-
gaining relationship. Involved are the expenses and efforts of manage-
ment either in litigation or arbitration and, for the union, the expense and
effort involved in an arbitration. To meet these problems, the parties to
the bargaining relationship could adopt special provisions, including al-
location of costs. The problem with such a rule arises in the Humphrey
v. Moore"2 situation, where the union makes a decision among competing
interests of different employees. Subjecting this decision to challenge in
a court or through arbitration would more seriously disrupt the exclusive
bargaining status. However, a rule might properly be developed that
60. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
61. As a practical matter, the expense and the burdens of litigation may continue
to discourage employee suits despite a relaxation of the Vaca rule.
62. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). See text accompanying notes 44-45 sup'ra.
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allows individuals or groups of employees to have a neutral hearing based
on a simple breach of contract standard whenever the issue involves only
a question of their relationship to the employer, while a higher standard
could be imposed to review questions involving inter-employee relation-
ships. Allowing employees access to arbitration to challenge either a
union or union-management decision with a presumption running in favor
of that decision might be the optimum rule." Benefitted by such a pre-
sumption, the arbitrator would only have to decide if the union got some-
thing of benefit for the unit or some unit members that would justify the
sacrifice required of the affected employees.
Competing Unions, § 301 Suits and Arbitration
In addition to protecting union-management operations within the
arbitral process from attack by employees, the Supreme Court has also
insulated the arbitration process of one collective bargaining relationship
from interference by another union whose interests might be affected. In
Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,64 the IME had a production and
maintenance unit at a Westinghouse plant that excluded all salaried tech-
nical employees. An abutting Federation unit included all salaried tech-
nical employees but excluded production and maintenance employees. In
a grievance filed under its contract, UE claimed that, in the engineering
lab, certain employees represented by Federation were performing pro-
duction and maintenance work. When Westinghouse refused to arbitrate
on the ground it was a representation issue exclusively for NLRB deter-
mination, the IME brought suit in state court to compel arbitration.
Throughout the dispute the Federation refused to be party to arbitration
under the IUE contract.
.Justice Douglas for the Court analyzed the "jurisdictional" case as
either a work assignment issue (that IME wanted Federation employees
removed from the work and wanted it assigned to IME members) or a
representation case (that the employees presently doing the claimed work
continue doing it but that they be represented by the UE). Even though
Federation would not be party to the arbitration and could not be bound
by the outcome, arbitration was ordered:
63. Recent Supreme Court cases construing the due process clause require notice
and a hearing before the government may deprive persons of property rights. See Fu-
entes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (summary procedure to seize goods or chattels un-
der a writ of replevin) ; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's li-
cense) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (suspension of welfare payments). A
similar argument could be made to protect employment rights if industrial self-govern-
ment was viewed as state action. See Symposium: Indtvidual Rights in Industrial Self-
Governnent--"State Actim" Analysis, 63 Nw. U.L: Rxv. 4 (1968).
64. 375 U;S.'261,(1964).
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If it is a work assignment dispute, arbitration conveniently fills
a gap and avoids the necessity of a strike to bring the matter to
the Board. If it is a representation matter, resort to arbitration
may have a pervasive, curative effect even though one union is
not a party."
Justice Harlan concurred on the ground that the hazard of "duplica-
tive proceedings" was conjectural.66 Subsequently the conjecture was
removed and the hazard of not only duplicate but of triplicate proceedings
was realized. In the arbitration that followed, the arbitrator found the
issue to be a representation matter and he split the employees between the
two unions based on their individual wage levels." Though the opinion
of the Court suggested that the Board should show deference to an
award," the Board decided the case on its merits, refusing to defer, be-
cause the award failed to ". . . clearly reflect the use of and be conson-
ant with Board standards."6 The Board found all the employees to be
part of the salaried and technical unit represented by the Federation.
Carey was an exercise in futility because of an inherent limitation of
arbitration: it is a system to resolve disputes based on voluntary partici-
pation of the parties to the dispute. Generally, union and management,
as parties to a collective bargaining relationship, agree both to arbitra-
tion to resolve disputes arising during the term of the contract and to the
rules for arbitration; i.e., what kind of dispute can be taken to arbitration,
who can force arbitration, when and how the arbitrator is selected, and
what standard and remedies the arbitrator will apply. Arbitration will not
be effective, and probably will not operate fairly, where all the concerned
parties do not have a chance to participate in the creation and operation of
the arbitration system."0 There is no essential difference between Carey,
where two unions and an employer were disputing, and Humphrey, Vaca
or Lockridge, where one union, an employer and one or more employees
65. Id. at 272.
66. Id. at 273.
67. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 45 Lab. Arb. 161 (1965) (Feinberg, Arbitrator).
68. 375 U.S. at 271. Justices Black and Clark dissented, arguing that the rights
of the Federation and its members would be sacrificed without due process if the NLRB
gave any weight to the arbitration proceedings between IUE and Westinghouse. Id. at
274. See also Jones, An Arbitral Answer to a Judicial Dilenma: The Carey Decision
and Trilateral Arbitration of Jurisdictional Disrtntes, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 327 (1964).
69. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768, 771 (1967).
70. For an example of the ineffectiveness of arbitration involving competing organ-
izations, see Hotel Employer's Ass'n, 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966), where the arbitrator,
operating under a collective bargaining agreement between a union and an employer's
association, struck down an agreement with a civil rights .group allegedly coerced from
the employers by unlawful picketing and threats of violence. The union was not party
to the agreement and the civil rights group was not party to, nor represented during,
the arbitration proceedings.
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had conflicting interests in a dispute. The parties to the dispute who are
not full participants in the arbitration process have little or no chance to
insert themselves into the arbitration process through the courts. Their
only option is to take their case to the NLRB. As in the preceding section,
the question is whether the balance struck so heavily in favor Qf arbitra-
tion is justified, especially if the Collyer principle applies thereby restrict-
ing NLRB jurisdiction over the dispute.
THE NLRB AND THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
While arbitration is substantially insulated from court interference,
the Supreme Court has allowed the NLRB to exercise extensive jurisdic-
tion concurrent with arbitral jurisdiction. In Beacon Piece Dyeing &
Finishing Co.,71 the Board clearly held that a mere unilateral change in
working conditions violated § 8(a) (5) because the employer had re-
fused to bargain before effecting the changes. The Board declined to de-
fer to a possible contractual remedy in favor of vindicating a statutory
policy of open access to the Board for unfair labor practice charges:
[We have] consistently held that the collective-bargaining re-
quirement of the Act is not satisfied by a substitution of the
grievance procedure of a contract, unless the grievance provi-
sions of the contract contain a waiver of the statutory right "ex-
pressed in clear and unmistakable terms."72
The NLRB analog of John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston" (which
decided that courts have jurisdiction to determine that a collective bar-
gaining agreement is binding on labor and management) is NLRB v.
Strong.4 In Strong a multi-employer association bargained a con-
tract for its members. Five days after the effective date, Strong refused
to sign the contract and sought to withdraw from the association. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Board finding that the employer has violated
§§ 8(a) (1)" and (5) :
Here the unfair labor practice was the failure of the em-
ployer to sign and acknowledge the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement which had been negotiated and concluded
on his behalf. 6
The real argument in the case concerned the proper forum to determine
71. 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958).
72. Id. at 961.
73. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). See text accompanying notes 12-13 Mtpra.
74. 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
76. 393 U.S. at 359.
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the remedy for the breach of contract. The company argued that, once
the Board made the determination that the company was bound by the
contract, arbitration was the proper forum to determine the remedies.
The Board, which had ordered the payment of fringe benefits as provided
in the contract, convinced the majority that it had remedial power:
Admittedly, the Board has no plenary authority to administer
and enforce collective bargaining contracts. . . . But the busi-
ness of the Board, among other things, is to adjudicate and
remedy unfair labor practices. Its authority to do so is not "af-
fected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise..."
§ 10(a), 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). Hence, it has been
made clear that in some circumstances the authority of the Board
and the law of contract are overlapping, concurrent regimes,
neither preempting the other.
77
Where there is no question that a collective bargaining agreement
binds the parties, the Board has jurisdiction to hear § 8(a) (5) cases
even in the face of arbitration provisions. In NLRB v. Acme Industrial
Co.,7 the agreement contained procedures for processing grievances cul-
minating in compulsory and binding arbitration. When the employer
moved some machinery out of the plant, the union asked for information
about the move to assess its rights under two contract clauses, one stating
it was a company policy not to subcontract work normally performed by
unit members where layoffs will result and the other providing that af-
fected employees had a right to a job transfer when equipment was moved
to a new location. After the company refused to provide the information,
the union filed grievances and a § 8(a) (5) charge. The Board found a
violation since the information requested was necessary to evaluate the
grievances and since the agreement contained no clause by which the
union clearly and unmistakably waived its statutory right to such infor-
mation." The Supreme Court upheld the Board and found that the
NLRB was not required to defer to arbitration. justice Stewart distin-
guished the Trilogy cases by indicating that the Board had greater ex-
pertise in enforcing the Act than did courts in deciding breach of collec-
tive bargaining contract actions."0 Thus, the expertise of arbitrators did
not outweigh that of the Board.
77. Id. at 360.
78. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
79. Acme Indus. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1964). For a discussion of the "clear
and unmistakable waiver" doctrine, see Schatzki, NLRB Resolution of Contract Disputes
Under Sectiont 8(a)(5), 50 TEax. L. R.v. 225 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Schatzki].
80. 385 U.S. at 436-37.
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In a companion case to Acme, the Supreme Court justified further
intrusion of Board jurisdiction into collective bargaining. In NLRB v. C
& C Plywood Corp.," the agreement in effect had no arbitration provi-
sions and had a "zipper" clause, waiving for the term of the contract the
right to bargain collectively with respect to all subject matter not sped-
fically covered by the contract even if the matter was not within the con-
templation or knowledge of either or both parties at the time the con-
tract was negotiated. Based on a section allowing the company to grant
individual merit or premium pay raises for special fitness or aptitude, the
company installed an incentive pay system for employees in several clas-
sifications assigned to glue spreading crews. The Board found the com-
pany's unilateral action during the term of the contract had vioated §
8(a) (5)."2 The Supreme Court upheld the Board, saying:
the Board has not construed a labor agreement to determine the
extent of the contractual rights which were given the union by
the employer. It has not imposed its own view of what the terms
and conditions of the labor agreement should be. It has done no
more than merely enforce a statutory right which Congress con-
sidered necessary to allow labor and management to get on with
the process of reaching fair terms and conditions of employ-
ment - "to provide a means by which agreement may be
reached." The Board's interpretation went only so far as was
necessary to determine that the union did not agree to give up
these statutory safeguards. Thus, the Board, in necessarily con-
struing a labor agreement to decide this unfair labor practice
case, has not exceeded the jurisdiction laid out for it by Con-
gress. 8
The bargain C & C Plywood struck in order to get a contract with a
zipper clause but without arbitration was, to some extent, undermined by
the Court's decision allowing the Board to exercise the power to resolve
disputes in a manner functionally equivalent to that of an arbitrator. Had
the company predicted that the Board would be imposed in an "arbitra-
tor's role," it may well have exercised its bargaining power to gain ad-
vantage in other areas. It may be that the unexpressed but pivotal judg-
ment made by the Supreme Court is that the availability of Board pro-
cesses is as likely to be a successful substitute for individual strife as is
arbitration. Under that analysis, leaving the option to the union to go to
the Board or to arbitration would minimize the number and severity of
81. 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
82. C&C Plywood Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 414 (1964).
83. 385 U.S. at 428.
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strikes during the term of collective bargaining agreements. The ques-
tion unanswered by C & C Plywood is why access to courts is not as ade-
quate a source of dispute resolution as the NLRB or arbitration.
A question arising because of the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Board and arbitration is whether that jurisdiction is completely coexten-
sive. The Supreme Court in Strong, Acme and C & C Plywood, and the
Board in C & S Industries, Inc.,84 have indicated that the NLRB does
not have jurisdiction over every breach of contract claim. But in effect it
seems the Board does have plenary power since there are no clear stops in
the Board rule. Under the Board's "clear and unmistakable waiver" doc-
trine almost any dispute that arises during the term of a contract can be
and is decided. 5
In the Board analog to the Amalgamated Street, Electric Railway
& lotor Coach Employees v. Lockridge86 situation (where a member
claims his union has violated the union constitution), the Supreme Court
has approved the principle that union members must have unimpeded
access to the Board. NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers,s7 in-
volved a union member who claimed his local president had violated the
84. 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966).
85. Professor Schatzki has listed some cases of minimal impact and importance
where the Board has exercised § 8(a) (5) jurisdiction:
Unilateral changes held unlawful include abolition of Christmas bonuses (no
matter how zealously identified as voluntary and no matter how steadfastly
kept out of contracts despite union efforts to the contrary) [Beacon Journal
Publishing Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 734 (1967)], switching a single employee from
a Monday through Friday shift to a Tuesday through Saturday shift [Long
Lake & Lumber Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1475 (1966)1, abolition of a job classification
resulting in a single reclassification [Eaton Yale & Towle, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 600
(1968) ], institution of a code of conduct for employees to supplant a similar code
that had been implemented unilaterally but without union protest [General
Elec. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 77 L.R.R.M. 1561 (July 14, 1969)], and with-
drawal of a free employee service worth approximately 32% cents per year per
employee [Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 73 L.R.R.M. 1549
(June 15, 1969)].
Schatzki, supra note 79, at 225. However, § 8(d) denies the Board the authority to
impose specific contract terms on the parties to a collective bargaining relationship.
H. K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99 (1970). The pertinent language of § 8(d)
provides that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
Arbitrators are similarly limited. The exercise of such power would be struck
down as altering the contract or deciding an "interests versus rights" arbitration beyond
the scope of the arbitration provision in all but the rarest of cases. See Elgin, Joliet & E.
Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), for a discussion of "interests versus rights" ques-
tions in the Railway Labor context. See also E. ELKOTJRI & F. ELxoulr, How AImTRA-
TION W oxs 29-47 (rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as ELxouRI]. But see West Towns
Bus Co. v. Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 26 Ill. App. 2d 398, 168 N.E.2d
473 (1960), ordering arbitration to determine the terms of a new contract.
86. 403 U.S. 274 (1971). See text accompanying notes 50-59 supra.
87. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
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union constitution and caused his employer to discriminate against him.
The union expelled him for failing to exhaust his intra-union remedies
before filing § 8(b) (1) (A) 8 charges with the Board. A second §
8(b) (1) (A) charge was filed because of the expulsion, on which the
Board found a violation."9 The Supreme Court held that the strong public
policy in favor of open access to the Board supported the decision that it
is unlawful for a union to expel a member for taking his claim to the
Board:
In the present case a whole complex of public policy issues
was raised by Holder's original charge. It implicated not only
the union but the employer. The employer might also have
been made a party and comprehensive and coordinated remedies
provided. Those issues cannot be fully explored in an internal
union proceeding. There cannot be any justification to make
the public processes wait until the union member exhausts in-
ternal procedures plainly inadequate to deal with all phases of
the complex problem concerning employer, union, and employee
member."0
Arbitration and Individual Claims
Under Statutes Other Than the NLRA
In statutory areas outside the NLRA that relate to employment, the
Supreme Court has recently run a rather unsteady course in determining
the proper role for arbitration. In U. S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguel-
les,91 a union-member seaman worked under a collective bargaining agree-
ment that provided for arbitration. After returning from a voyage to
88. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1970) (union restraint or coercion of employees
in the exercise of rights under § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), made an unfair labor prac-
tice). See also notes 174, 211 infra.
89. Industrial Marine & Shipbuilding Workers Local 22, 159 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966).
90. 391 U.S. at 425.
A recent case demonstrates further the sensitivity of the Court towards due process
requirements in arbitration. In NLRB v. Plasterers Local No. 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971),
a § 8(b) (4) (D) charge was filed in a jurisdictional dispute between two unions. In
§ 8(b) (4) (D) cases, the Board must, under § 10(k) "hear and determine the dispute
out of which [the] unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless . . . the parties to
such dispute" adjust or agree upon a method for the voluntary adjustment of the dis-
pute. 29 U.S.C. § 160(K) (1970). The unions, but not the employer, were parties to
a joint board established to resolve jurisdictional disputes. At issue was Board deferral
where the employer is not party to a joint board. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion, adopted the Board's position that employers are parties to jurisdictional dis-
putes. 404 U.S. at 124-26. Since all the necessary parties had not agreed to some vol-
untary method of adjustment, the Board was entitled to hold a hearing to determine the
dispute as required by § 10(k).
91. 400 U.S. 351 (1971).
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Vietnam, Arguelles brought suit in federal court pursuant to the Sea-
man's Relief Act 2 for wages due under the contract and for a statutory
penalty for failure to pay wages at the proper time. The employer de-
fended on the ground that Arguelles was required to exhaust the grievance-
arbitration procedures available in the contract before a court action
could be brought. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that
the seanan had a right of direct access to the courts without any need to
exhaust available arbitration procedures.93 The rationale was that, his-
torically, seamen have been special wards of admiralty. Because of that
status and since there was no clear showing in the passage of § 301 that
Congress meant to abrogate seamen's direct access to courts long pro-
vided in the Seaman's Relief Act, seamen, as a limited exception to the
general rule, need not exhaust their contractual remedies. Justice White
dissented on the ground that the entire dispute, including the determina-
tion of the statutory penalty, depends on a resolution of the collective bar-
gaining questions. 4 He cited Fair Labor Standard Act cases for the pro-
position that statutory claims may be settled by arbitrators and that courts
should defer to arbitration. 5
Arguelles could have two effects. It could be a harbinger of a chang-
ing attitude on the Court that individuals with claims connected with
their employment have greater access to courts for the resolution of their
claims regardless of the existence of arbitration. The other, more limited,
effect seems more likely in view of recent cases. In that view Arguelles
is a narrow, peculiar exception to the general rule of accommodation in
favor of arbitration. In Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad"9
decided after Arguelles, a railroad worker filed a state suit for wrongful
discharge because his employer did not allow him to return to work after
allegedly recovering from injuries suffered in an auto accident. After re-
moval to federal court, the case was dismissed because the employee had
failed to exhaust the arbitration remedies provided for railroad workers97
under the Railway Labor Act."3 This decision was directly in opposition
to Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad.99 Moore held that a railroad
employee who elected to treat his employer's breach of the employment
92. 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1970).
93. 400 U.S. at 356.
94. Id. at 371.
95. Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Beckley v. Teyssier, 332 F.2d
495 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Donahue
v. Sesquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943).
96. 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
97. Id. at 321.
98. 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1970).
99. 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
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contract as a discharge was not required to resort to the remedies afforded
under the Railway Labor Act for adjustment and arbitration of grie-
vances, but was free to commence in state court an action based on state
law for breach of contract.100
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Andrews, agreed with
the trial court and specifically overruled Moore.'' Thus, an employee
must exhaust the arbitration procedures provided by the Railway Labor
Act before coming to court since the only source of petitioner's right not
to be discharged is the collective bargaining agreement between the em-
ployer and the union.' 2 Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the
only issue involved was whether the employee had sufficiently recovered
from his injuries to perform his prior duties." 3 Despite this being a very
typical kind of case for an arbitrator to handle, Justice Douglas suggests
this case did not present an issue involving a collective bargaining agree-
ment.
Were the Court in a mood to expand Arguelles, Andrews would have
been a likely case to do it by reaffirming Moore. Two other cases have
recently reached the Court, and in each it has struggled with uncertain
results to accommodate arbitration with statutory claims of individuals
bearing on their employment. In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,"°'
Dewey claimed he had been discharged because of his religious beliefs.
He was fired for refusing to work as scheduled on Saturday and for re-
fusing to find a replacement. An arbitrator had denied Dewey's grievance
which made an "identical claim set forth in his [court] complaint."'05
His complaints filed with a state fair employment practices commission
and with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance were denied, but the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found probable cause that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been violated.' The district
court found for Dewey,0 7 but the Sixth Circuit reversed on two grounds.
First, the district court erred in applying EEOC regulations that were not
yet in effect at the time of discharge.' More importantly for this paper,
the arbitration award should be given final and finding effect since:
It is clear that if the arbitrator of the grievances had granted an
award to Dewey, instead of to Reynolds, the award would have
100. Id. at 634.
101. 406 U.S. at 326.
102. Id. at 324.
103. Id. at 426.
104. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
105. Id. at 327.
106. Id.
107. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
108. 429 F.2d at 329-30.
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been final, binding and conclusive on Reyonlds. Reynolds would
not have been permitted to relitigate the award in the courts."'
8
Granting certiorari because of a conflict in the circuits,1 ' the Supreme
Court, with Justice Harlan taking no part, affirmed per curiam by an
equally divided Court."' That decision is not binding on lower courts
and it could be distinguished as only involving the question of the ap-
plication of the EEOC Regulations, but it obviously will have some im-
pact.11
2
The second case concerned the federal wage-hour law. Although
there is longstanding precedent that employees claiming violation of the
Fair Labor Standard Act must exhaust their contract remedies before
initiating a lawsuit,"' the issue came before the Court in Iowa Beef
Packers, Inc. v. Thompson."4 Employees worked under a collective bar-
gaining agreement that provided for a nonpaid lunch period during which
the company required them to be "on call". The employees brought a
FLSA suit in state court to recover overtime compensation, claiming that
being "on call" rendered the lunch period "work time". Finding for the
employees, the trial court, affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court,"' held
that employees need not exhaust grievance-arbitration provisions in their
109. Id. at 331.
110. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). Cf. Fekete v. United States Steel
Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
111. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
112. Dewey has already had effect in the Sixth Circuit. See Spann v. Joanna
Western 'Mills Co., 446 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1971) (reaffirming the rationale of Dewey).
But see Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971), where the court stated that
Dewey is based on an estoppel rationale rather than on the doctrine of election of rem-
edies. Newman was not estopped from bringing the action because the arbitrator had
no authority under the contract to decide the issue of alleged racial discrimination. The
court treated Spann as a true estoppel situation since the employee in that case had al-
ready accepted reinstatement as provided in the award before he reasserted his claim for
back pay.
The Fifth Circuit has adopted the Dewey rationale in Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
467 F.2d 54 (1972).
The EEOC seems to be moving towards the use of private arbitration to resolve
title VII claims. At the mid-term meeting of the Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity Law of the A.B.A.'s Section on Labor Law, Jack Pemberton, Acting Gen-
eral Counsel of the EEOC, said that the Commission may favor such an approach if
appropriate conditions were attached. At a minimum he indicated,
the aggrieved party should be independently represented, should have avail-
able discovery procedures, and that the arbitration panel should be independent
of either the company or union.
A.B.A. REPoRT, supra note 49, at 13.
113. See cases cited in note 95 supra.
114. 405 U.S. 228 (1972). For a discussion of the Iowa Beef Packers case, see
text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
115. Thompson v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 738 (Iowa 1971).
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contract before bringing suit." 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on
that question"1 but then dismissed it as improvidently granted because the
grievance was not arbitrable under the narrow arbitration provision." 8
Justice Douglas dissented on the issue of arbitrability and reprimanded
the Court for not deciding the case on the merits."' But also, he would
extend to wage-hour claims the Arguelles principle of the open courthouse
door.
THE COLLYER DECISION
Once the background of Supreme Court opinions has been estab-
lished, Collyer Insulated Wire2 ' can be put in perspective. In Collyer,
three incidents were in dispute. During the negotiations preceding the
contract in effect when the case arose, the company tried without success
to bargain for a wage increase for skilled maintenance personnel above the
across-the-board increase given all employees. After the negotiations,
both the company and the union continued to discuss a raise for the skilled
maintenance employees. The company finally told the union that in five
days it would institute a twenty cent per hour increase. The union con-
tinued to object, claiming that changes should only be based on a re-
evaluation of all jobs in the plant. A second issue concerned the removal
of one of the two maintenance machinists assigned to each worm gear
maintenance crew and their replacement by a machine operator and helper.
The third question concerned rate changes for extruder machine operators.
The complaint as issued, claimed the company made unilateral
changes in certain wages and working conditions in violation of §
8(a) (5). The company defended that the changes made were sanctioned
by the collective bargaining agreement in effect between the company and
the union and that any claim that its actions exceeded contract authoriza-
tion should be remedied through the grievance and arbitration provisions
of the agreement. While the trial examiner found the company had
violated § 8(a) (5), the Board disagreed.' 2' In an opinion by Chairman
Miller and Member Kennedy, with a concurrence by Member Brown, the
Board held:
We find merit in respondent's exceptions that because this dis-
pute in its entirety arises from the contract between the parties'
116. 405 U.S. at 228.
117. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 404 U.S. 820 (1972).
118. 405 U.S. at 229-30.
119. Id. at 230, 232.
120. 192 N.LR.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (Aug. 20, 1971).
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relationship under the contract, it ought to be resolved in the
manner which that contract prescribes.
2
The Miller-Kennedy opinion is structured around one central principle:
arbitrators are better able than the NLRB to resolve disputes arising
during the course of a bargaining agreement because they have special skill
and experience deciding bargaining relationship issues. Support for this
assumption is marshalled by showing the contract issues presented in the
case:
(a) the extent to which [company] actions were intended to be
reserved to the management, subject to later adjustment by
grievance and arbitration; (b) the extent to which the skill
factor increase should properly be construed. . . as a "change
in the general scale of pay" or, conversely, as "adjustments in
individual rates . . . to remove inequalities or for other proper
reason"; (c) the extent, if any, to which the procedures .
governing new or changed jobs and job rates should have
been made applicable to the skill factor increase here; and (d)
the extent to which any of these issues may be affected by the
long course of dealing between the parties.'23
The judgment that arbitrators have more expertise in deciding bargaining
relationship issues seems not to be based on any hard data. It could be
premised on acceptance of the Trilogy rhetoric about arbitrators,'24 or,
it could be based on the simple analysis that since Board personnel must
involve themselves with many different kinds of cases and issues, only
a small portion of their work concerns bargaining relationship questions.
Arbitrators, on the other hand devote almost all of their efforts to such
issues.
Structuring a deferral policy around this judgment can cause some
difficulty, since that is not the same judgment underlying the Supreme
Court's policy in the Trilogy. The premise underlying the Court's ap-
proach is that a fully developed arbitration process, as well as concurrent
NLRB jurisdiction, are adequate substitutes for use of economic force to
resolve disputes arising during the term of a contract. By making its
judgment, the Collyer majority avoided coming to grips with the question
of what impact a policy of deferral will have on the incidence and severity
of employment strife occurring over contract disputes.
121. Id. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1932.
122. Id. at - 77 L.R.P.M. at 1934.
123. Id.
124. See note 22 supra.
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Some interesting inferences can be drawn about the health of a col-
lective bargaining relationship when parties to a dispute either forego
entirely grievance-arbitration procedures or proceed concurrently before
the Board and in arbitration. Where the grieving party foregoes or re-
jects arbitration, a strong suspicion arises that the collective bargaining
relationship is suffering severe distress. The issue for the Board is
whether a policy of deferral that channels the parties into arbitration pro-
motes the re-establishment of a healthy or at least tolerable relationship.
If arbitration produces a result both sides can live with, that may put the
parties back on the path to a normal relationship, but a fruitless experience
may drive the parties further apart tending to make their estrangement
permanent.
While renunciation of arbitration might be a litmus test of estrange-
ment in a collective bargaining relationship, attempting to operate con-
currently in arbitration and before the Board seems to raise the inference
of tactical maneuvering. There are several advantages for the challenging
party in using the Board to resolve disputes. First, the charging party
need not bear the cost nor the burden of prosecution while still putting
the cost of defense on the opposing party. Second, the "clear and unmis-
takable waiver" rule used by the Board to decide § 8(a) (5) claims aris-
ing during the term of a labor contract 5 is an easy standard under which
to show a violation.'26 These two tactical reasons give the charging party
advantages in having the Board actually decide the case. The third reason
for going to the Board and to arbitration simultaneously is to delay any
final decision of the dispute. Assuming advantage to the grieving party
if the dispute is kept alive, filing arbitration grievances while also filing
unfair labor practice charges prevents final arbitration decision-making
since (1) Board determinations take precedence and (2) the Board
takes time to investigate the charges and to decide whether to issue a com-
plaint. The Collyer majority, in focusing their opinion on the expertise
of arbitrators, precluded consideration of this roadblock effect.
After setting out its central thesis on the superior expertise of arbi-
trators, the Collyer opinion cites a litany of authority for the proposition
that the Board has jurisdiction over § 8 disputes even when other means of
settlement have been agreed upon by the parties, but that the Board may,
in its discretion, defer to such agreed-to means of settlement.' In the past,
125. See notes 79, 85 supra & text accompanying.
126. Schatzki, supra note 79, at 225.
127. 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1935. The Board cites Carey v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) ; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195
(1962). See text accompanying notes 35-37, 64-69 supra. The Board also relied on the
Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
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the Board has generally deferred to an award rendered by an arbitra-
tor,2 ' but the majority confesses that in the pre-award situation the Board
has been "less clear", with no principle being consistently applied.'29
In an attempt to show the use of a deferral principle in cases predating
the Nixon Board, the majority quotes at length from Joseph Schlitz Brew-
ing Co., 3' describing it as the most significant recent case:
[W]here, as here, the contract clearly provides for grievance
and arbitration machinery, where the unilateral action taken is
not designed to undermine the Union and is not patently errone-
ous, but rather is based on a substantial claim of contractual
privilege, and it appears that the contract will resolve both the
unfair labor practice issue and the contract interpretation issue
in a manner compatible with the purposes of the Act, then the
Board should defer to the arbitration clause conceived by the
parties. This particular case is indeed an appropriate one for
just such deferral. The parties have an unusually long estab-
lished and successful bargaining relationship; they have a dis-
pute involving substantive contract interpretation almost clas-
sical in its form, each party asserting a reasonable claim in good
faith in a situation wholly devoid of unlawful conduct or aggra-
vated circumstances of any kind; and they have a clearly defined
grievance-arbitration procedure which Respondent has urged the
Union to use for resolving their dispute; and, significantly, the
Respondent, . . . offered to discuss the entire matter with the
Union prior to taking such action."'
The majority then attempts to indicate how the similarity of facts be-
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See text accompanying notes 14-
22, 31-34 supra. Finally, the Board found support for its proposition in §§ 203(d) &
301 of Labor Management Reporting Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
128. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). But see Bond, supra note 22.
Investigation of the Board's use of jurisdictional discretion shows that the
ad hoc basis on which the Board reaches decisions had led to contradiction,
confusion, and quite possibly arbitrariness. The jurisdictional rationales seem
mainly to be frosting applied when the Board agrees with the results of the
arbitrator.
Id. at 51. See also Lev & Fishman, Suggestions to Management: Arbitration v. The
Labor Board, 10 B.C. IND. & Coar. L. REV. 763 (1969), where it is suggested that defer-
ral has involved more "backfilling and sidestepping in this area of Board law than in any
other area." Id. at 783.
129. 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936. See Schatzld, supra note 79, at
225, where Professor Schatzki traces the episodic history of deferrals.
130. 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 142 (1969).
131. 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936.
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tween Collyer and Schlitz leads them to their decision that deferral is
proper in Collyer:
Here, as in Schlitz, this dispute arises within the confines of
a long and productive collective-bargaining relationship. The
parties before us have, for 35 years, mutually and voluntarily
resolved the conflicts which inhere in collective bargaining.
Here, as there, no claim is made of enmity by Respondent to
employees' exercise of protected rights. Respondent has credibly
asserted its willingness to resort to arbitration under a clause
providing for arbitration in a very broad range of disputes and
unquestionably broad enough to embrace this dispute.
Finally. . . the dispute is one eminently well suited to resolu-
tion by arbitration. The contract and its meaning in the present
circumstances lie at the center of this dispute. In contrast, the
Act and its policies become involved only if it is determined that
the agreement between the parties, examined in the light of its
negotiating history and the practices of the parties thereunder,
did not sanction Respondent's right to make the disputed
changes, subject to review if sought by the Union, under the
contractually prescribed procedure. That threshold determina-
tion is clearly within the expertise of a mutually agreed-upon
arbitrator.13
2
What is unclear and what may prove troublesome is the extent to which
factual identity to Schlitz is now necessary to trigger a deferral decision.
The weakness is that the Board in Collyer has made its decision turn on
the judgment of arbitral expertise. While that judgment may well be
correct, the majority chose not to suggest any doctrinal basis for defining
where the broad principle of deferral will be effective. Without a dis-
cussion of either the nature of arbitration or of policy considerations
favoring elimination of dual jurisdiction, the majority relied on a factual
comparison to a prior case which led to the desired result. The threat is
that future cases, where a deferral issue is raised, will continue to be
handled on an ad hoc, result oriented basis. Perhaps sensitivity to com-
mon law methodology is necessary. However, the Board's failure to ex-
plain what facts or conditions were essential to their holding in Collyer
could stimulate inconsistent and undesirable decisions.
The majority in Collyer dismissed the complaint but retained juris-
diction over the dispute so the case could be reopened upon a showing that:
132. Id.
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(a) the dispute has not, with reasonable promptness after the
issuance of this decision, either been resolved by amicable settle-
ment in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to arbi-
tration, or, (b) the grievance or arbitration procedures have not
been fair and regular or have reached a result which is repugnant
to the Act.'
One question that will arise is whether the complaining party can avoid
arbitration through various dilatory tactics and then still be able to return
to the Board. Since such a reopening would be a bonanza for the party
seeking delay, the rule should not allow reopening of the case where arbi-
tration failed due to conduct of the party who originally filed unfair labor
practice charges.
To secure a majority, Miller-Kennedy relied on the concurrence of
Member Brown, who has long been a deferral advocate." 4 Based on the
characterization of a contract dispute either as an interests dispute to ac-
quire rights in the future or as a rights dispute to assert a right that ac-
crued in the past,'35 Brown suggests that the Board only defer where the
dispute is a rights dispute. The clear-cut case of an interests dispute is the
drafting of new contract terms for the future when no present agreement
is in effect. More difficult cases occur when a collective bargaining agree-
ment is in effect but no terms in the contract specifically bear on the sub-
ject matter of the dispute. Brown's argument is that where the dispute is
133. Id. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938. The second condition which the Board said
must be met before the case could be reopened ties pre-award deferral policy to the past
award review standard established in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
134. See, e.g., Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 888 (1963) (Leedom & Brown,
Members, dissenting); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1420
(1964) (Brown, Member, concurring) ; Leroy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1434
(1964) Brown, Member, concurring and dissenting in part) ; Gravenslund Operating Co.
d/b/a Wash. Hardware & Furniture Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 513, 515 (1967) (Brown, Mem-
ber, dissenting) ; Univis, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 37 (1969) (Brown, Member, dissenting);
McLean Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 440 (1969); Eastern Ill. Gas & Sec. Co., 175
N.L.R.B. 639,641 (1969) (Brown, Member, dissenting); Steves Sash & Door Inc., 178
N.L.R.B. 154, 155 (1969) (Brown, Member, dissenting); Dresser Indus. Valve & In-
strument Div., 178 N.L.R.B. 317, 319 (1969) (Brown, Member, concurring); Macy's
California, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 74 L.R.R.M. 1305 (June 15, 1970) (Brown, Member,
dissenting); Consolidated Foods Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 78, 74 L.R.R.M. 1374, 1375
(June 22, 1970) (Brown, Member, dissenting).
135. In interest disputes the arbitrator drafts an agreement that will bind the parties
in the future while arbitrators in rights disputes merely interpret an existing or prior
agreement between the parties. See Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723
(1945) ; EcOURI, supra note 85, at 29-47.
On September 11, 1972, the Board heard oral arguments on the issue of deferral in
a case where an employer's association insisted on the arbitration of new contract terms
("interest" arbitration) as a mandatory subject of bargaining. Mechanical Contractor's
Ass'n, No. 2-CA-12413 (N.L.R.B., filed July 30, 1971).
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not encompassed by language in the agreement, the dispute is an interests
dispute because it has not been bargained by the parties. Thus, Brown
would replace the present Board standard of a "clear and unmistakable
waiver" for deciding bargaining duty cases arising during the term of a
contract with his interests-rights analysis. Drawing such a distinction is
subject to the same criticism levelled against the "clear and unmistakable
waiver" doctrine: it does not give full force to the institutional or
organic nature of a collective bargaining agreement."' Great sensitivity
is required to determine why a subject is unexpressed in the agreement
or in bargaining history. It may be so much a part of the shared experi-
ence that the subject is an unstated assumption underlying all that goes
on. Conversely, there are unexpressed subjects that truly have had no
impact in the collective bargaining relationship. Brown attempts to solve
this problem by saying that in disputes that are "ambiguous", i.e., it is
not clear whether the dispute is an interests or rights dispute, he would
defer. This exception seems so broad and all-inclusive as to devour the
rule, leaving no real limit on deferral.
Unlike the Miller-Kennedy opinion, Brown does suggest the range
of Board cases beyond § 8(a) (5) in which deferral would be appropriate.
He would defer "whether the disputes involved alleged violations of-§ §
8(a) (5), (3),"37 or (1) or whether brought by the employer, the union,
or an employee"."' He justifies binding the employee to the acts of
the union by arguing that another rule would interfere with "the statutory
objective of fostering voluntary settlements by parties to collective-
bargaining agreements"." 9 In most situations the union is a strong ad-
vocate of an employee's position in a dispute, but there is a problem in
two situations. The first is where the union must take a position on a dis-
pute among competing individuals or groups of employees all of whom
are represented by the same union. Whichever side the union takes ad-
versely affects the position of some employees. The second situation is
136. This theory underpins the Steelworkers Trilogy, see text accompanying notes
14-22, 31-34 supra. Professor Cox perhaps has said it best:
There are too many people, too many problems, too many unforeseeable con-
tingencies to make the words of the contract the exclusive source of rights and
duties. One cannot reduce all the rules governing a community like an in-
dustrial plant to fifteen or even fifty pages. Within the sphere of collective
bargaining, the institutional characteristics and the governmental nature of the
collective bargaining process demand a common law of the shop which imple-
ments and furnishes the context of the agreement.
Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. RFv. 1482, 1498-99 (1959) [here-
inafter cited as Cox].
137. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970) (employer discrimination to encourage or dis-
*courage union membership made an unfair labor practice).
138. 192 N.L.R.B. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1939.
139. Id. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1940.
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where the union or union and management are both hostile towards one
particular employee. Despite the due process problems, Brown would not
give Board protection to those employees but would leave them to their
contractual fate.
One area where Brown would narrow the scope of deferral is in're-
presentation cases. Thus, he would not follow Raley's Inc.,4" where an
arbitration award ordered that some jobs constituted an accretion to that
union's unit. In Raley's, a representation case brought by the union that
lost the jobs because of the first union's award, the Board deferred to the
award even though the challenging union had not been a party to the
arbitral proceedings. In such situations Brown would not defer because
he considers unit determinations central to the Board's public policy func-
tion. Another objection to Raley's is that all the parties to the dispute
were not party to the arbitration process, thereby making it unlikely that
the excluded party's interests would be fairly treated.
Member Fanning dissented in Collyer on several grounds. The con-
tract did not require arbitration to be the exclusive remedy for disputes.
Fanning indicated he would defer only when the parties had agreed to a
provision prohibiting either party from taking disputes to a court or
agency."' Further, he would not defer in this case since neither party had
actually resorted to their grievance-arbitration procedures to resolve this
particular dispute.142 Fanning characterizes the Board's deferral as forc-
ing arbitration or making it compulsory.'43 However, arbitration is com-
pulsory only in the sense that no other forum can decide the dispute. The
Board will not re-enter the case until there has been an unsuccessful at-
tempt at arbitration.' The parties contracted to submit disputes to arbi-
tration, so the Board's deferral policy is no more than holding the parties
to their executory agreement. Citing Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB,'45
and H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,'46 Fanning then predicts the Supreme
Court would strike down a deferral policy as beyond the Board's grant
of authority.4 7 However, he fails to address himself to the support the
Supreme Court has given the concept of Board deferral in Smith v.
140. 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963).
141. 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.A. at 1942.
142. Id. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1941.
143. Id.
144. Id. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
145. 365 U.S. 667 (1961). The Supreme Court struck down the Board's require-
ments for agreements providing for hiring halls.
146. 397 U.S. 99 (1970). The Supreme Court held that the Board lacked power
to remedy § 8(a) (5) violations by ordering the inclusion of a checkoff provision in a
collective bargaining agreement.
147. 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1944.
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Evening News Association,'48 Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.""
and NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers.'
Fanning also dissented on the ground that the expertise of arbitrators
extends only to the interpretation of bargaining agreements and that
arbitrators are unqualified to apply the NLRA, even to factual situations
that are typical to their arbitrational experience.' He also suggests that
arbitrators might be prone to overlook union and management unfair
labor practices because unions and companies jointly pay the arbitrator's
fees. 2 The majority attempted to counter these difficulties by retaining
jurisdiction should the grievance or arbitration process have "reached a
result which is repugnant to the Act."'58
The dissent of Member Jenkins is more substantial. Although the
charge in Collyer was filed by the union and not an individual employee,
Jenkins raised the due process question that deferral will cut off the Board
as a forum for the resolution of the statutory claims of individual em-
ployees without providing those individuals an adequate substitute.
Starting with Amalgamated Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge,'5 Jenkins equates the jurisdiction of state courts
to hear individual employee complaints with the jurisdiction of the arbitra-
tion process to resolve employee claims arising during the term of a col-
lective bargaining agreement.' Based on that equation, he suggests that
the Supreme Court would strike down the Board's deferral to arbitral
authority since arbitrators would be deciding statutory questions using
contract standards.' 6 However, the fact that the Court has given such
consistent and strong support to arbitration makes it questionable whether
the Court will now strike down a policy that channels to arbitration in-
dividual employee's claims arising under the NLRA. It seems likely that
the Court would find arbitration an adequate substitute forum for the
NLRB.15
7
148. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
149. 375 U.S. 261 (1964). See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
150. 391 U.S. 418 (1968). See text accompanying notes 87-90 Vtpra.
151. 192 N.L.R.B. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1943.
152. Id.
153. 192 N.L.R.B. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
154. 403 U.S. 274 (1971). See text accompanying notes 50-59 supra.
155. 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1944-46.
156. Id. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1945-47.
157. The ultimate case testing this conclusion would be an employee's claim that
he had been disciplined for violating a contract provision prohibiting taking claims to
the NLRB. In NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972), the Supreme Court con-
strued § 8(a) (4) broadly to prohibit the discharge of employees for giving statements
to a Board field examiner. Section 8(a) (4) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he had
filed charges or given testimony under this Act." 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (4) (1970). While
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Jenkins criticizes arbitration as a process for the resolution of dis-
putes. He first rejects the majority's use of Carey, Smith and the Steel-
workers Trilogy on the ground that none of those cases involved an un-
fair labor practice.' Although the conduct underlying unilateral change
of contract charges is the same whether reviewed by the Board or an
arbitrator, Jenkins, as did Fanning, insists that the statutory standard is
so different that arbitrators have no expertise to determine the statutory
issue.' Jenkins then criticizes arbitration as being slow, expensive, and
in increasing disfavor by union and management.'
Scrinever did not involve a collective bargaining agreement, the policy of unrestricted ac-
cess to the Board arguably would supersede any contract provision disciplining individual
employees for resorting to the Board without first exhausting grievance-arbitration pro-
cedures provided in the contract. But the issue of whether an employee can be dis-
charged for going to the Board with a grievance is separable from the issue of whether
the Board, once a charge has been filed, should defer to arbitration. Thus the resolu-
tion of our hypothetical case is still unclear.
Jenkins correctly suggests, 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1946, that the
Board must come to grips with NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S.
418 (1968). There, the Court held that a union could not terminate an employee's mem-
bership merely because a rule requiring the exhaustion of internal union remedies was
violated. However, the legality of a rule denying access to the Board is wholely dif-
ferent from a policy of deferral to another authority. In any event, the employee does
gain something by having initial access to the Board because the Board may decide not
to defer. Even if the Board defers, the employee gains since the NLRB retains juris-
diction to determine whether an award is compatible with the statute.
Whether an arbitrator should determine the legality of a provision continues to be a
much discussed issue. No matter which way a particular arbitrator goes, however, the
Board, under Collyer, retains jurisdiction to decide whether the statutory question has
been resolved in a manner repugnant to the Act. For a discussion of the arbitrator's
proper approach to the legality issue, see Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and
Conflicting Remedies of Employment Discrimination, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 30 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Meltzer]. See also Waks, The "Dual Jurisdiction" Problem in
Labor Arbitration: A Research Report, 23 ARB. J. (n.s.) 201, 226 (1968), where the
author concludes from a study of cases raising statutory questions that,
companies, unions and arbitrators take no special pains in the routine case to
preclude the possibility that a party disappointed by the award will try to re-
litigate the issue before the NLRB.
Reference to NLRB policies was found in only 54 of the 338 cases studied by Waks.
Id. at 226-27. This certainly suggests that the parties to arbitration agreements are not
thinking in terms of later recourse to the public forum.
158. 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1947-48.
159. See Schatzki, supra note 79, at 225.
160. But see Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Apprisals and Criticifsms of
the Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MIcE. L. REv. 1115 (1964) :
By an overwhelming majority our respondents indicate that they prefer
the arbitration process to the available alternatives as a method of ultimate
resolutions of contract application (grievance) disputes.
Id. at 1116.
Perhaps the time has come for further inquiry into the attitudes of management and
labor towards arbitration. More fundamentally, research is necessary to make a
qualitative assessment of how well arbitration works. See Kilberg & Blach, Making
Realistic the Arbitration Alternative, 50 J. OF URBAN L. 21 (1972), where suggestions
are made to improve the mechanics of arbitration.
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Finally, Jenkins suggests that there is no practical limit to the policy
of deferral and that deferral undermines the Board's "clear and unmis-
takable waiver" doctrine:
The majority is reading out of our jurisdiction the statutory
protection against all unfair labor practices which may involve
in part, and perhaps distantly, the interpretation of a contract
provision, where the contract contains an arbitration clause.
Most unfair labor practices can be connected somehow to con-
tract terms or existing practices, by broad construction of
general clauses, by the necessary inquiry into existing practices,
by "waiver", or otherwise.'
Presumably, the only cases the Board would hear involving contract dis-
putes arising during the term of the contract would be where the agree-
ment did not provide for arbitration.'62 A good argument can be made
that the clear and unmistakable waiver doctrine is out of phase with the
prevailing view of collective bargaining relationships, and should there-
fore be displaced. Professor Schatzki points out that the doctrine is based
on the assumption that parties in collective bargaining relationships intend
to waive nothing unless they somewhere make express waivers," 3 but
that assumption is unwarranted in light of the accepted view that collec-
tive bargaining agreements are organic, constitutional documents that
must be fleshed out through experience and interpretation. The Board's
approach seems less able than arbitration to sort out unexpressed assump-
tions from truly neglected subjects. Indeed, one of the reasons for the
special, insulated status given the arbitration process is that arbitration
can sensitively perform a judicial function in the development of the com-
mon law of the shop."" Moreover, with continued concurrent jurisdiction,
problems of differing standards and inconsistent results may arise. Defer-
ral both eliminates an unwarranted doctrine and provides for consistency
and predictability. Thus, Jenkin's conclusion that the clear and unmis-
takable waiver doctrine has been undermined sub silentio by a policy of
deferral seems accurate as well as appropriate.
Progeny of Collyer
Shortly after Collyer was decided the term of Member Brown ex-
pired. Whether Collyer would have any lasting effect depended on the
161. 192 N.L.R.B. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1949.
162. The situation in NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967), offers
an example. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
163. Schatzki, supra note 79, at 242.
164. See Cox, supra note 136.
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position the new Board member would take. Until February 23, 1972,
when the new nominee was finally selected, the Board suspended action
on the fate of Collyer because of the two-to-two deadlock. During this
period General Counsel Peter G. Nash issued and made public his mem-
orandum to the regional offices interpreting and establishing procedures
effectuating Collyer. Since it has become clear that new Member Penello
has joined the Miller-Kennedy camp supporting a general deferral
policy,"' there has emerged a pattern of cases indicating the future of the
Collyer principle. One general conclusion is that the policy of deferral is
developing along the general lines of the Steelworkers Trilogy in deter-
mining the relationship of courts to arbitration. Also, Members Miller,
Kennedy and Penello have been careful to control the decision process so
that a rather consistent application of the doctrine has evolved. This con-
trol has been exercised by having the full Board consider all questions of
deferral on which the three majority members agree that deferral is ap-
propriate.' A final conclusion is that the General Counsel has taken a
view of Collyer that is much narrower than that taken by the Board.
One recent case reveals a new analysis quite different from Collyer,
although the result is the same. In National Radio Co.,' a case before
the full Board, employee O'Connell had handled most of the grievance
duties for the union pursuant to a contract that provided "time lost ...
in settling grievances shall be paid by the Company."'0 8 In 1968, O'Con-
nell had been paid for 1520 hours under this provision; in 1969 he was
paid for 1195 hours. The contract further provided that stewards "shall
be permitted free movement within the plant,"1 ' but that the employer had
the "right to establish rules pertaining to the operation of the plant."'17
Under its plant rule power, the company told O'Connell that he must re-
port to his supervisor before leaving the department and indicate where
he was going and how long he would be gone. O'Connell refused to report
and, after a number of warnings, was discharged.
A grievance was filed along with § § 8(a) (3) and (5) unfair
labor practice charges. In the dance between competing forums, an arbi-
trator was selected and simultaneously an NLRB hearing was held on the
165. Titus-Will Ford Sales, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 4, CCH LAB. L. REP., 1972
NLRB Dec. 24,229, at 31,222 (May 26, 1972); Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 197
N.L.R.B. No. 14, CCH LAB. L. RE., 1972 NLRB Dec. 24,221, at 31, 209-3 (May 24,
1972).
166. This is possible because at least one member of the majority sits on every
three member panel and any member of a panel can have the case considered by all the
members of the Board.
167. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (July 31, 1972).




grievance. When the regional director refused to stay the hearing on the
unfair labor practices, the arbitrator continued the arbitration pending
the outcome of the Board action. The trial examiner found the company
had violated both § § 8(a) (3) and (5). The Miller-Kennedy-Penello
majority found that, like Collyer, the entire "controversy is, at bottom, a
substantial dispute over the meaning of contract provisions."'' To sup-
port that conclusion the majority cited four issues: 1) the plant rule
provision; 2) the "free movement" provision; 3) the "just cause" for
discharge standard; and 4) the question of the extent to which the con-
tract had been affected by the parties' course of dealing. 2
The General Counsel tried to distinguish Collyer by indicating that
in National Radio a § 8(a) (3) charge could survive on a mere showing
of anti-union animus,' whereas the § 714 charge in Collyer necessitated
a contractual breach. Although the majority characterized the problem
as a grave concern requiring a cautious approach, they accepted the com-
pany's argument that the proper basis of deferral is a policy of admin-
istrative abstention:
Respondent's contention that our authority is improvidently
invoked does not rest on any presumed primacy of an arbitrator
to interpret an ambiguous or contested contract provision. Ab-
stention is urged on the straight forward basis that the contract
prohibits discipline for other than "just cause" and provides a
mechanism for the quick and fair vindication of employee rights
when that clause is violated.
Implicit in Respondent's argument, as we apprehend it, is the as-
sumption that the arbitration proceeding will lead to a resolution
171. Id. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1721.
172. Id.
173. The majority acknowledged this problem:
there exists a narrow penumbra of the dispute wherein it is possible that adop-
tion of the reporting procedure was within Respondents contractually sanc-
tioned domain and, so, no breach of agreement, but nevertheless prohibited by
the Act because undertaken for discriminatory motive.
198 N.L.R.B. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1721.
174. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activity except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment authorized in section 8(a) (3).
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of the dispute which will not be "repugnant to purposes and
policies of the Act."'
175
Thus the majority accorded arbitration the status of a forum capable of
deciding disputes beyond sheer contract claims. The basis for the con-
clusion is the integral part arbitration plays in virtually all collective
bargaining agreements and the ever increasing demand for the services of
arbitrators. As to discharge situations, the Board indicated that "just
cause" discipline cases are the most frequent type of case arbitrated."'
Because the Board was seeking a "rational accommodation" between
arbitration and Board authority and since it viewed the systems to be of
equal competence, the majority decided to channel cases to arbitration to
relieve the Board of some of its ever-increasing caseload. 7 Another rea-
son given for accommodation in favor of arbitration is the unsettling effect
of concurrent attempts to resolve a dispute which inevitably results in
Board interference in the arbitration process." 8 National Radio itself was
a perfect example. After a hearing on the merits, the arbitrator was
forced to delay his decision because the regional director insisted on pro-
ceeding with the Board hearing. As a result, everyone involved was re-
quired to suffer through the expense and effort of two complete, de novo
hearings to determine the consequences of one factual occurrenceY"
Although the majority in National Radio announced the new doc-
trine of abstention, the emergence of the principle does not seem neces-
sary to the decision of that case. Deferral could have been justified via a
Collyer analysis, reasoning that "just cause" discipline cases basically are
contract interpretation questions within the expertise of arbitrators even
though the decision necessarily involves a finding on the question of anti-
union animus. One explanation for the shift might be the majority's
realization that the Collyer rationale, which is limited to a comparison of
the expertise of the Board and arbitrators, does not allow a discussion of
all the factors necessary to rationally accommodate two systems of con-
175. 193 N.L.R.B. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722.
176. Id. at -, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1723.
177. Id. at -, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1723 n.12.
178. Id. at -, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722-23 n.8.
179. The regional director's refusal to delay the NLRB proceeding was in viola-
tion of the Board policy established in Dubo Mfg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963). In
1967, the then General Counsel Arnold Ordman described Dubo as having established a
policy of deferral when the
grievance - arbitration procedure is being actively pursued . . . if it appears
that there is a substantial likelihood that the utilization of the procedure will
set the dispute at rest.
Ordman, Arbitration and the NLRB-.A Second Look, in BNA LABo REL ATIONS YEAR-
rooK : 1967, 197, at 202 (1967). Yet the Dubo policy, like so many other Board deferral
policies, has been honored more in the breach than in the observance.
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flict resolution. The language in National Radio makes it easier to
discuss such policy questions as caseload, the interference factor when
competing forums have concurrent jurisdiction over the same dispute,
and the kinds of cases where the Board should retain original jurisdiction
rather than defer.
An alternate, and probably more accurate, explanation is that the
majority opinions in Collyer and National Radio were written by two
different Board members. It is assumed that Miller wrote Collyer because
of his frequent strong statements in favor of deferral, and that either
Kennedy or Penello wrote National Radio. Between the two, the best
guess would seem to be Member Kennedy since he had more experience
on the Board. More fundamentally, the language in National Radio
closely compares with Kennedy's language and approach in several
other cases.'
It may be that Miller and Penello accepted the majority opinion
without distinguishing their approach by way of concurrence because they
agreed with the result and felt that the potential was slight for conflicting
results. If so, they underestimated the risk that Collyer and National
Radio might result in alternate methods of analysis, making Board super-
vision of the regional offices and administrative law judges more difficult.
Further, the Board's ambiguity creates a problem of litigation technique
because it is not clear whether "arbitrator expertise" or "rational accom-
modation" theories should be pursued.
Statutory Issues Where Board Will Defer
In Appalachian Power Co.,' a case much like National Radio and
issued on the same day, the Board used a Collyer analysis, rather than a
National Radio approach, to defer a contract issue in a § 8(a) (3)
180. In Airco Indus. Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 79 L.R.R.M. 1467 (March 1,
1972), Kennedy, in dissent, argued for deferral whether or not the record clearly indi-
cated that the NLRB claim had been litigated:
If the parties here, having chosen to have the basic issue of the justness of
the discharge determined by an arbitrator, failed adequately to present as thor-
ough a case as could have been developed on the issue of discrimination it was
not for want of a proper forum in which such issue could, and should, have
been raised.
Id. at - , 79 L.R.R.M. at 1469.
In Yourga Trucking, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1972), the ma-
jority indicated that the party seeking deferral to a prior award must prove that the
statutory issue could have been raised. Member Kennedy, in a separate opinion, stated that
he would defer to a prior arbitration decision even if, with the benefit of hindsight, a
statutory issue could have been raised. Kennedy's positions and language in both
Airco and Yourga compare with the language in National Radio to make it likely that
Kennedy drafted that opinion as well.
181. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 80 L.R.R.M. 1731 (July 31, 1972).
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case.'82 An employee had been granted a leave of absence under a provi-
sion which allowed leaves to "[a]n employee who is selected as [a
union] representative . . in matters pertaining to the bargaining
units."'' While on union leave he was active in organizing efforts at
unorganized company installations. After the union won an election at a
plant of a sister company, the company cancelled his leave because his
conduct on leave was "both contrary to the letter as well as the intent of
the [leave] provisions."'8 4
While the Miller-Kennedy-Penello majority could have applied the
National Radio abstention analysis by saying that it was rational to allow
an arbitrator to decide the penumbral issue of whether the company's
action was discriminatorily motivated, their opinion instead stated the
issue exclusively as a contract question. The opinion dealt with the pro-
blem of anti-union motivation in three steps. First, the majority held that
a contract provision which would prohibit an employee from acting as a
union organizer while on leave is not "so inherently destructive of statu-
tory rights as to amount, without more, to a per se violation of Section
8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act."'8 5 Had the majority found the clause to be
a per se violation of § 8(a) (3), they would not have deferred. This ap-
pears to be an attempt to express a limitation on deferral in § 8(a) (3)
cases. This reasoning is similar to that found in National Radio, where the
Board indicated that there may be some limit to deferral where a claim of
anti-union animus is made:
[A] lthough the alleged violation of Section 8(a) (3) subsumes
a charge of union animus by Respondent, we believe this case
must be distinguished from those in which a history of such
animus or pattern of action subversive of Section 7 rights has
been alleged. 's
The second step in the Appalachian Power analysis was characteriz-
ing as "overdrawn" the trial examiner's finding that the company acted
out of animus even if its interpretation of the contract was correct."8 7
That finding was based on the company's distribution of letters during
182. Members Fanning and Jenkins again dissented; this time on the ground that
the employee must be protected in the exercise of his § 7 rights to engage in concerted
activity whether or not he is on leave of absence.
183. 198 N.L.R.B. at -, So L.R.R.M. at 1732.
184. Id.
185. Id. at -, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1733. This language is drawn from NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
186. 198 N.L.R.B. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1724. The General Counsel's Collyer
memorandum, sce note 7 supra & text accompanying, would not allow deferral where the
employer's contractual claim was used to conceal an effort to undermine the union.
187. 198 N.L.R.B. at -, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1734.
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the organization campaign claiming the employee had violated the terms of
his leave by engaging in organizational activities. The majority held that
this activity was proper since it merely dissipated the inference that the
company had sponsored the union by granting the leave. Thus, by deciding
this animus issue on the merits the Board created a second limitation on
deferral in § 8(a) (3) cases. At this level, the Appalachian Power and
National Radio cases conflict. Under National Radio, the determination
of the discriminatory motivation of the employer (even when the action
taken could be justified by contract) would be a penumbral issue to be
decided by the arbitrator rather than the Board.
The third step in Appalachian Power was to defer to arbitration to
determine whether the company's action in revoking the leave of absence
was justified under the contract. 8 Under the Appalachian Power an-
alysis, before deferral is ordered there must be a finding that the statutory
issue is coextensive with the contract issue. Because the right to leave
was entirely derived from the contract, the statutory issue of discrimina-
tion was completely eliminated if the company had the contract right to
cancel the leave. If the company breached the contract, it also committed
an unfair labor practice which presumably would be remedied by the ar-
bitrator's award. The end result of Appalachian Power is to cause dupli-
cate proceedings to decide one dispute by dividing the issues between the
Board and arbitration.'89
Both National Radio and Appalachian Power indicate a limit on de-
ferral where employer enmity toward employee or union rights is involved.
But in Malrite, Inc.,' where the company attempted to undermine the
union, the Board deferred to an award that had been ignored by the em-
ployer. The agreement, covering radio station employees, provided for
separate engineer and announcer jobs to be scheduled during the day but
allowed a 5'combo" engineer-announcer on the late night shift. After
securing the written consent of the individual employees affected, the com-
pany began assigning "combos" around the clock, paying them a higher
wage rate than was provided in the contract. Despite the finding by the
trial examiner that the soliciting of the consent of individual employees
constituted individual bargaining calculated to undermine the union as
exclusive bargaining representative, and despite the refusal of the em-
188. Id.
189. The Board could have avoided duplication by addressing the last issue first
and deferring on that issue. The Board could have retained jurisdiction and decided
the penumbral issue if it became necessary to do so. While this approach still would
involve decisions by duplicate forums, it would eliminate the hazards of the concurrent
operation of both forums.
190. 198 N.LR.B. No. 3, 80 L.R.R.M. 1593 (July 18, 1972).
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ployer to comply with an arbitration award, the Miller-Kennedy-Penello
majority deferred to the award. The fact that an award had already been
issued might make some difference in this case since the union could bring
a § 301 action in state or federal court to enforce the award.1 9' But the
entire course of this employer's conduct would seem to fit within the ex-
ception from deferral whether that exception is described as a "pattern of
subversive activity" (to use National Radio language) or "conduct in-
herently destructive" of statutory rights (Appalachian Power language).
The opinion fails to discuss National Radio or Appalachian Power and
by that failure raises questions whether the language expressing some
limit on deferral because of a company animus claim carries any meaning.
Another area in which the Board indicated it would defer to arbitra-
tion is the determination of the legality of authorizations by individual
employees for the checkoff of union dues. In Beer Distributors Associa-
tion0 2 a panel of Miller and Kennedy in the majority, with Fanning in
dissent, deferred to arbitration in a § 8(a) (5) case where the union
claimed management had unilaterally ceased the checkoff of union dues
required by the contract. The employers had argued that the individual
authorization cards were invalid because they were in violation of §
3023 of the Labor-Management Relations Acte" and that the question of
the cards' validity was not arbitrable. The majority held that the deter-
mination whether the cards violated § 302 was for the arbitrator:
[W]hether the authorizations were valid will determine in
this case the ultimate question of whether Respondents did or
did not violate the agreement by refusing to make the deduc-
tions. That is clearly a contract issue fully capable of resolution
under the contractual procedures for resolving such disputes.'9 5
While it is true that determining the statutory issue will determine the
contract issue, this analysis is the converse of that used in Collyer and
Appalachian Power. In those cases the statutory issue could be resolved
191. For a discussion of deferral to awards that have already been rendered, see
notes 244-66 infra.
192. 196 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 80 L.R.R.M. 1235 (July 18, 1972).
193. Section 302(c) (4) provides that an employer may pay to labor organizations:
• . . money deducted from the wages of employees in payment of member-
ship dues in a labor organization: Provided, that the employer has received
from each employee, on whose account such deductions are made, a written as-
signment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or
beyond the termination date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever
occurs sooner.
29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (4) (1970).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 610, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-68, 171-87, 193 (1970).
195. 196 N.L.R.B. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1237.
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by first determining the contract question. Here the contract question is
dependent on the statutory issue of the legality of checkoff authorizations.
The explanation for deferral in this case may be that the enforcement of
checkoff authorizations is a matter for court enforcement by the parties
and the NLRB is without jurisdiction to enforce § 302."'6 Thus, if the
Board normally cannot determine the legality of checkoff authoriza-
tions, it was not surrendering any of its jurisdiction in Beer Distributors.
The failure of the Board to describe the unusual nature of a case in-
volving § 302 might cause trouble in situations such as representation
cases where the Board has primary jurisdiction to decide statutory ques-
tions. Beer Distributors could be applied by saying that determination
of the representation question would decide the contract question thereby
making the whole issue capable of resolution under the arbitration pro-
visions. Without a clear declaration of the limits of Beer Distributors,
the regional offices and administrative law judges might defer to arbitra-
tion in cases where the Board would not."6 7
Since the Board has consistently deferred in § 8(a) (5) cases, it
was predictable that the deferral policy would be extended to § 8(b) (3)
cases involving claims of union failure to bargain in good faith. In Team-
sters Local 70 (National Biscuit Co.),19 the employer filed § 8(b) (3)
charges citing the union's refusal to allow drivers to continue collecting
money on their delivery routes. It was claimed that this union edict un-
ilaterally altered a contract provision requiring drivers to collect money
and that it also violated a clause requiring all past practices to remain in
effect for the term of the contract. The Miller-Kennedy-Penello majority
deferred to arbitration because "the resolution of this dispute necessarily
depends upon a determination of the correct interpretation of a con-
tract. .. ."l9
In cases involving representation issues, even when cast in unfair
labor practice terms, the Board has refused to defer, though the question
is yet to be faced by the full Board. Apparently, Member Brown's position
in his concurring opinion in Collyer, that representation questions should
be decided by the Board, has carried some weight in several cases since
his departure. 0 The first post-Collyer case that refused deferral for the
196. Salient & Salient, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 816 (1950).
197. For a discussion of deferral in representation cases, see notes 200-06 infra.
198. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.R.R.M. 1727 (July 31, 1972).
199. Id. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1729. In discussing the relation of § 8(b) (1) (A)
charges to the § 8(b) (3) claim the Board held that a determination of the contract
claim in the union's favor would make resolution of the 8(b) (1) (A) claim unnecessary.
Id. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1730 n.8. For a discussion of deferral to intra union rem-
edies, see notes 211-14 infra.
200. See the discussion of Brown's position in the text accompanying note 140
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resolution of a representation issue was Ipco Hospital Supply Corp.."1
The case came before the Board as a § 8(a) (2)202 claim; the employer
had closed an office at which the union had a clerical unit and had moved
the office to a new location. Although only one employee moved to the
new location and none of the employees at the new office were solicited
by or joined the union, the employer, as a part of a settlement agreement
of a strike at the new facility, recognized the union as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative. A panel of Miller, Fanning and Jenkins unani-
mously adopted the trial examiner's findings that there should be no de-
ferral:
iT]he issue before the Board is whether the exclusive recogni-
tion of the Union provided for in the settlement agreement was
an unfair labor practice. Obviously, this is a matter falling with-
in the special competence of the Board to resolve. As the case
before the Board does not essentially involve a dispute over the
terms and meanings of a contract, as was the situation in Col-
lyer, there are no policy considerations warranting deference to
arbitration."'
In Combustion Engineering, Inc."' a panel of Fanning, Jenldns and
Kennedy refused to defer to an award by an arbitrator which had held
appropriate a unit made up of two plants. The company had opened a
new plant eight miles from the original but there had been no production
or employee interchange between the plants:
[T]he question of whether the existing contract was intended,
or can be construed, to cover those employees at East Windsor
who were hired after its effective date is a question for the arbit-
rator, but his conclusion on that issue does not govern or guide
the Board in its disposition of the issue presented here .... [I]t
is nevetheless the obligation of the Board to determine
whether the employees at East Windsor constituted an accretion
to the existing unit.205
Both Ipco and Combustion Engineering were decided in March,
1972. In June, a panel with Kennedy and Penello in the majority and
suepra. This position undermines two earlier cases which indicated that it was proper to
defer in representation cases. See Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964) ; Raley's,
Inc. 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963).
201. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 182, 79 L.R.R.M. 1641 (Mar. 22, 1972).
202. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970) (employer domination of, interference with or
financial support of union made an unfair labor practice).
203. 195 N.L.R.B. at - , 79 L.R.R.M. at 1642.
204. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.M. 1577 (Mar. 15, 1972).
205. Id. at - , 79 L.R.R.M. at 1579.
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Jenkins in dissent, departed from those cases and deferred to arbitration
in a representation issue case. In Urban N. Patnuan, Inc.,2"' the employer
was a member of a multi-employer association that bargained on behalf
of the sausage industry. In addition to the sausage department which was
covered by the association agreement, the employer operated a pre-cooked
foods department. The pre-cooked foods employees had been paid accord-
ing to the sausage makers contract until the employer discovered that his
labor costs were not competitive. After requesting the union and em-
ployees to accept a lower rate, which request was refused, the employer
closed for the annual shutdown. The employees came back to work at
the lower wages after the employer indicated he would not reopen at the
higher rates. The union then filed § 8(a) (5) charges because of the
unilateral change of rates. The company defended on the ground that the
contract did not cover the pre-cooked foods employees.
Had the panel followed Ipco and Combustion Engineering, the
question of the coverage of the sausage industry agreement and the ex-
istence of arbitration would not defeat the Board policy of hearing repre-
sentation questions. Instead, the panel deferred to arbitration. The one
way Patman may be distinguished from Ipco and Combustion is to view
the case as having no representational aspect. That can be done if the em-
ployer argued that no question existed over the inclusion of the pre-cooked
foods employees in the unit represented by the union but that the only
question was whether there had ever been any bargaining that resulted
in a collective bargaining contract for those employees. Possibly by sacri-
ficing the representation defense, the employer channelled the dispute
into arbitration. If this distinction is not made, it appears that the opera-
tion of the deferral principle in representation cases is unsettled and may
be moving toward a broader application of the deferral policy.
The Board has yet to decide several areas of Board jurisdiction
where a policy of deferral might be applied. On September 11, 1972,
the Board heard oral arguments on a case in one such area. In Mechani-
cal Contractor's Association"' the question was whether the Board should
defer to arbitration where an employer's association insisted, as a manda-
tory subject of bargaining, on the use of arbitration to establish future
contract terms."' Since former Member Brown would not defer to "in-
terest" arbitration, the outcome in the Mechanical Contractors case should
206. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 80 L.R.R.M. 1481 (Mar. 6, 1972).
207. No. 2-CA-12413 (N.L.R.B., filed July 30, 1971).
208. General Counsel Nash, in his Collyer memorandum, indicated that he would
have the regional offices solicit Washington for advice on whether to defer in such
cases. See Collyer memorandum, supra note 7, at 15,018.
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be a good indicator of Brown's continuing influence and of present limita-
tions on the deferral doctrine.
Another area yet unresolved is the NLRB v. Acme Industrials Co.2"'
question where the request by a bargaining representative for informa-
tion it considered relevant and necessary to process a grievance was
denied.'1 Because the duty to supply information is part of the basic §
8(a) (5) duty to bargain, it may be argued the Board should decide such
cases. Refusing to provide information about grievances, however, strikes
at the integrity of the grievance-arbitration procedures agreed to by the
parties. Perhaps the best way to answer that threat is to channel the parties
into arbitration so they become accustomed to it as an open and function-
ing system. A policy of deferral to arbitration in refusal to provide in-
formation cases therefore seems especially appropriate.
A final unresolved area of Board jurisdiction that might warrant
application of a deferral policy is the question of the role of intra-union
remedies in § 8(b) (1) (a) cases.211 Under their jurisdiction to hear duty
of fair representation questions, courts have required the exhaustion of
intra-union grievance procedures as a condition precedent to suit.2"2 By
analogy, the Board could decide to defer § 8(b) (1) (a) cases to intra-
union procedures. To date the Board has not had a suitable case arise
involving the question.1 3 An issue that would arise is whether the intra-
209. 385 U.S. 432 (1967). See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
210. The General Counsel's memorandum on Collyer suggests that arbitration
should not be deferred to in such cases unless the underlying grievance is already before
the arbitrator. See Collycr memorandum, supra note 7, at 15,017-18.
211. Section 8(b) (1) (A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion or its agents
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 7: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein ....
20 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A).
212. Foley v. Chrysler Corp., 78 L.R.R.M. 2744 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 12, 1971). See
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 122-24 (Supp. 1971).
213. However, there is some indication in Teamsters Local 70 (National Biscuit),
198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.R.R.M. 1727 (July 31, 1972), that the Board will defer in such
cases. In Local 70 the employer asserted an 8(b) (3) claim, arguing that a union order
to its members not to collect cash on delivery routes constituted a unilateral alteration
of the agreement. The Board deferred to union-management arbitration. An 8(b) (1)
(A) claim, arising in the same case, could not be similarly treated because intra-union
discipline is beyond the scope of union-management arbitration. Rather than deciding the
merits as it did in Appalachia Power, see text accompanying notes 181-89 supra, the
Board delayed hearing the 8(b) (1) (A) charge since it:
is dependent on a finding that Respondent unilaterally altered the terms and
conditions of employment . . . a finding . . . that Respondent did not alter
the terms and conditions of the contract would make unnecessary the enter-
tainment of the allegation of an 8(b) (1) (A) violation .
198 N.L.R.B. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1730 n.8.
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union remedies are sufficiently like arbitration to warrant deferral. The
typical intra-union grievance system provides a hearing or trial at the
local level, before local officials appointed to hear the case, as well as some
right of appeal to the union hierarchy. Usually no provision is made for
an outside arbitrator. However, the Board has indicated that it would
defer to a joint council system for the resolution of management-labor
conflicts and joint council systems typically do not provide for outside
arbitrators.""
Standard of Arbitrability
In the wake of Collyer, it is important to examine the current stan-
dards set for determining (1) whether a claim is substantial enough to
invoke the arbitration process; and (2) whether a dispute is within the
scope of the arbitration provision. The Supreme Court, in United Steel-
workers v. American Manufacturing Co.,2"5 held that courts should not
screen a claim before ordering arbitration except to determine that on its
face the claim is governed by the collective bargaining agreement. While
General Counsel Nash would not defer to arbitration unless the claim was
reasonable, 6 the Board seems to be moving toward the position of a court
in a § 301 suit to order arbitration; that is, deferring to arbitration when
the case is the typical sort of collective bargaining dispute, whether or not
there is language in the contract bearing on the dispute. In Teamsters
Local 70 (National Biscuit Co.),"' the majority held that a dispute was
arbitrable as long as one interpretation is not compelled. In Appalachian
Power Co.,2"' the Board indicated that a dispute is arbitrable where the
contractual provisions are susceptible of dual meanings, one consistent
with the company's position and the other consistent with the union's
position. In Beer Distributors Association,"9 Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.,22 and Urban N. Patman, Inc.,22 the Board deferred to arbitra-
tion because the disputes arguably arose from the collective bargaining
214. Teamsters Local 70 (National Biscuit), 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.R.R.M.
1727 (July 31, 1972). For a discussion of what constitutes arbitration for deferral
purposes, see notes 229-33 infra.
215. 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
216. Collyer memorandum, supra note 7, at 15,015.
217. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.RR.M. 1727, 1729 (July 31, 1972). See text accom-
panying notes 198-99 supra.
218. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 80 L.R.R.M. 1731, 1734 (July 31, 1972). See text accom-
panying notes 181-89 supra.
219. 196 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 80 L.R.R.M. 1235, 1237 (May 19, 1972). See text ac-
companying notes 192-95 supra.
220. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6. 80 L.R.R.M. 1711, 1712 (July 31, 1972).
221. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 80 L.R.R.M. 1481, 1482 (June 30, 1972). See text ac-
companying note 206 supra.
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agreements between the parties. In Peerless Pressed Metal Corp.,222 the
majority indicated that, in a unilateral imposition of an incentive wage
system situation, it would not defer to arbitration a claim that a provi-
sion for individual merit pay justified a general system of incentive pay
because such a claim is "nearly frivolous." '22  Ho-wever, the majority held
that the employer's claim that the unilateral adoption of the incentive
system was justified by bargaining history need not be meritorious before
the Board would defer. Thus, the Board deferred where the employer had
no contract language to rely on because it used bargaining history to sup-
port its contract defense.224
The problem of whether a particular dispute falls within the ambit of
the contract's arbitration provision must be viewed in light of the pre-
sumption of arbitrability used in deferral cases.225 The General Counsel
seems to indicate that there should not be a close review of arbitrability
before deferral is ordered. 6 In Beer Distributors Assn.22" the employer
argued that the determination of the legality under § 302 of employee
checkoff authorizations was not arbitrable. Apparently referring to the
Steelworkers Trilogy, the Board deferred to arbitration indicating that
the "issue of arbitrability should itself be submitted to the arbitrator, as has
become the near universal practice under collective-bargaining agree-
ments. '2'  That seems a good indication that the Board will decide ques-
tions of arbitrability using the same sort of presumption of arbitrability
used by courts in § 301 actions.
Final Binding Arbitration
An ancillary question that has arisen in several post-Collyer cases is
which systems used by union-management to resolve their disputes will be
accorded the status of arbitration for the purposes of deferral. In Tulsa-
Wlzisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc.,22 the full Board refused to defer be-
222. 19S N.L.R.B. No. 5, 80 L.R.R.M. 1708 & n.2 (July 31, 1972).
223. Id. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1708 n.1.
224. The Board deferred despite the fact that both sides had abandoned incentive
proposals during the bargaining negotiations. See also Great Coastal Express, Inc., 196
N.L.R.B. No. 129, 80 L.R.RM. 1097 (May 2, 1972), where the Board deferred a dispute
concerning employee parking privileges even though there was no reference to such
privileges in the contract.
225. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
226. Collyer memorandum, supra note 7, at 15,020.
227. 196 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 80 L.R.R.M. 1235 (May 19, 1972). See text accom-
panying notes 192-95 supra.
228. Id. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1237. See also Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197
N.L.R.B. No. 150, 80 L.R.R.M. 1481, 1483 (June 15, 1972), where the deferral order
specifically reserved Board jurisdiction to reopen the case if "the dispute has been duly
found by the arbitrator not to be arbitrable."
229. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 79 L.R.R.M. 1265 (Jan. 31, 1972).
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cause the arbitration provision of the contract did not provide for final
binding arbitration:
[W]henever the Respondent's general manager denies a grie-
vance at the final step, the contract binds no one to any further
procedure for peaceful resolution of the dispute. Thereafter,
only by ad hoc agreement of the parties can any forum of third
parties or a neutral arbitration be convened to resolve the dis-
pute.
23 0
However, in Teamsters Local 70 (National Biscuit Co.),"' the Miller-
Kennedy-Penello majority decided to defer to a typical Teamster provi-
sion for the resolution of disputes. Under that system, disputes not re-
solved by a local union and the employer immediately involved are referred
to a Joint Council on which union and employers have equal representa-
tion. A majority at that level may make a binding decision on the dispute
or submit it to binding arbitration. If the Joint Council deadlocks, the
parties to the dispute may resort to strikes and lockouts. Acknowledging
that this system does not provide for binding arbitration on demand by
either party, the majority distinguished Tulsa-Whisenhunt on the ground
that the National Biscuit contract provides for mandatory submission to
a Joint Council made up of union and employer representatives who are
not immediately involved in the dispute.232 Since neither the grieving
party nor the party grieved against can block the resolution of the dispute
under this system, the majority decided to defer. The majority relied on
the historical judgment that such bipartite grievance procedures have
worked well and have provided, in the overwhelming percentage of cases,
swift resolution of disputes without resort to strikes or lockouts.2 33
For deferral, therefore, it is not necessary for the grievance resolution
system to require final binding resolution by a neutral arbitrator of all
disputes. Nor is it necessary that the parties have given up the right to
strike or lockout over unresolved disputes. All that is needed is a tribunal
removed from the immediate parties to the dispute that may, but need not,
finally determine the issue.
INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES
In the normal case involving a claim by an individual employee, the
structure of arbitration assumes that the union will adequately represent
230. Id. at -, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
231. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.R.R.M. 1727 (July 31, 1972). See text accompany-
ing notes 198-99 supra.
232. Id. at -, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1729.
233. Id. at -, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1729-30 n.5.
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the individual employee's interests in the grievance-arbitration process.""
That assumption poses problems when the union and the individual em-
ployee are antagonistic or have conflicting interests. In Kansas Meat
Packers,23 two employees, one of whom was a union steward, had in-
creasingly strained relations with the union business agent as well as
management over safety issues. The conflicts ultimately resulted in their
discharge. During the dispute, the employees quit the union and stopped
the checkoff of dues. The steward resigned his union position following a
verbal altercation with the business agent. There was credited testimony
by a supervisor that they were fired at the insistence of the business agent.
Following the discharges, the union did nothing to investigate or to file
grievances concerning the discharges; nor did the union file unfair labor
practice charges. Section 8(a) (1) and (3) charges were filed by the dis-
charged employees. A panel of Miller, Jenkins and Kennedy refused to
defer:
Under all the facts and circumstances set forth above-par-
ticularly the apparent antagonism between the interests of the
discriminatees, on the one hand, and both parties to the collec-
tive-bargaining contract herein, on the other and the discrim-
inatee's resultant election to refrain from seeking redress though
that contract's grievance procedures-we conclude that it would
be repugnant to the purposes of the Act to defer to arbitration
in this case as to do so would relegate the Charging Parties to
an arbitral process authored, administered and invoked entirely
by parties hostile to their interests. 38
Thus, the test to determine whether there should be deferral is whether the
interests of the union and the employee are in substantial harmony. The
panel indicated that it had deferred in National Radio Co."' because there
the test had been satisfied and thus there was no ground for assuming
that the employee's interests would be inadequately represented under the
contractual procedures.
Several questions are raised by Kansas Meat Packers. Focusing on
the relationship between the individual and his union and placing such
importance on the representation of the employee by the union challenges
234. See notes 35-63 supra, for a discussion of the limited right of access to
courts that an employee has for review of his union's representation.
235. 198 N.L.RB. No. 2, 80 L.R.R.M. 1743 (July 31, 1972).
236. Id. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1746 (emphasis in original).
237. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1719 (July 31, 1972). See text accompany-
ing notes 167-80 mpra.
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the continued vitality of International Harvestor Co. 238 In that case the
Board deferred to an arbitration award in a § 8(a) (3) case even though
the union had sought the discharge of the employee and the employee's
positon had been presented in arbitration by the employer. Under Kansas
Meat Packers the conflict that existed between the employee and his union
would cause the Board to hear the case rather than deferring it to arbitra-
tion. 8'
A pragmatic question resulting from Kansas Meat Packers is whether
the regional staffs will exercise much sensitivity in determining the
quality of the relationship between an employee and the bargaining repre-
sentative. By reputation at least, the personnel at the regional level of the
Board have been reluctant to process charges filed by individual em-
ployees.2 4 Since the General Counsel assumed that the policy of deferral
would not be applied in § 8(a) (3) cases,24' the Collyer memorandum does
not establish the procedures that might be used to meet the Kansas Meat
Packers rules.
The most significant question is what scope will be given the "sub-
stantial harmony of interest" rule. Both National Radio and Kansas Meat
Packers were § 8(a) (3) cases in which employees challenged company
action discharging them; and the rule may be limited to such cases. How-
ever, employees who are adversely affected by a union decision among
competing employees or groups of employees could claim that there was
substantial conflict between themselves and their unions. One example
is where a union must decide between seniority rights of two groups of
employees competing for a limited number of jobs as in Humphrey v.
Moore.242 No matter what position the union takes, some employees will
be adversely affected. If those employees file § 8(a) (5) charges
against the employer and § 8(a) (3) charges against their union, Kansas
Meat Packers is a basis for denying deferral to arbitration. The ultimate
restraint on Kansas Meat Packers seems to be the principle of the exclu-
sive bargaining status of the union, which can only be defeated by a show-
ing of arbitrary or bad faith conduct. 42
238. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub noin., Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
239. The two cases may be distinguishable in that an arbitration award had al-
ready been rendered in International Harvester Co. Whether the employee was repre-
sented by the union or the employer, the Board might defer in such a case because the
employee has had a hearing before a neutral arbitrator.
240. Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, 22 N.Y.U. CoNF. ox
LABOR 171, 203 (1970).
241. See Collyer memorandum, supra note 7, at 15,016. The General Counsel's
opinion was clearly rejected in National Radio, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718
(July 31, 1972). See text accompanying notes 167-80 supra.
242. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
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DEFERRAL TO AWARDS
The Collyer opinion indicated that it had been consistent Board
policy to defer to arbitration awards where the awards met the so-called
Spielberg standards that (1) the proceedings be fair and regular; (2)
all parties agreed to be bound; and (3) the decision not be repugnant to
the purpose and polices of the Act.24 The cases since Collyer have focused
on an additional factor subsequently grafted onto the third criteria;2
that is, whether the unfair labor practice issue has been considered by the
arbitrator. Airco Industrial Gases4' was a § 8(a) (3) case where an
employee was discharged, allegedly because he had been negligent on the
job. An arbitrator's award upheld the discharge. Both union and manage-
ment were represented by counsel at the arbitration hearing and each side
was given full opportunity to present evidence. However, the record of the
hearing disclosed that no evidence had been introduced and there was
no discussion by the arbitrator that the employee had filed about 200
grievances in the two years preceding his discharge. Because of the
failure to discuss the issue of the pretextual discharge, a panel of Fanning
and Jenkins, with Kennedy in dissent, refused to defer to the award:
In the face of an arbitration award that gives no indication that
the arbitrator ruled on the unfair labor practice issue, deferral
would result in an extension of the Spielberg doctrine which we
are unwilling to make.247
In support of their conclusion, they cited Kalamazoo Typographical
Local 122,2" ' saying that no deference was given to-the arbitrator's award
in that § 8(b) (1) (A) case because the arbitrator there had specifically
disavowed handling any unfair labor practice aspects of the case.2 49 The
Airco approach provides a practical solution to the longstanding con-
troversy. 0 whether arbitrators should decide statutory issues or whether
243. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 726-56, for a discussion of both
the duty of fair representation and the Board's authority. See also notes 35-63 supra.
244. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
245. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1462 (1961).
246. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 79 L.R.R.M. 1467 (March 1, 1972).
247. Id. at - , 79 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
248. 193 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 78 L.R.R.M. 1458 (Nov. 1, 1971).
249. 195 N.L.R.B. at - , 79 LR.R.M at 1468.
250. For statements of the various positions taken in this debate, see Meltzer,
Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR, THE
NLRB AND THE COURTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 14-19 (D. Jones ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as THE
AUITRATOR] ; Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration: A Rejoinder, in THE ARsI-
TRATOR, id. at 58; Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law? ARBITRATION
AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL
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they should confine their decisions to contract matters: defer where the
arbitrator treated the statutory issue and do not defer when the arbitrator
either declined to decide the statutory claim or failed to show that the issue
had been litigated.
Perhaps the Airco case also provides a means for the Board to protect
individual employees from the "rigged" award situation. An arbitration
is rigged when the result is agreed to by union and management before
the hearing and this result is made known to the arbitrator; the hearing
and decision then serve as a sham to deceive the grievant that he or she
has had a fair hearing. Of course the determination that an arbitration
was rigged would be a basis for a successful lawsuit under Vaca v. Sipes25
as well as §§ 8(a) (1) and (3), 8(b) (1) (A) and (B), 2 and 8(b) (2)..
and (3)24 claims before the Board. Airco is itself a case that smells of a
rigged award: a union steward who was vociferous in asserting 200 gri-
evances in two years is foreordained to be considered a nuisance by man-
agement and he may also be a thorn to the union. The dischage of such
an employee for whatever reason should be closely scrutinized. Working
the discharge through the entire grievance-arbitration process, including
a hearing where both union and management are represented by counsel,
without ever raising the vigorous union activities of the grievant seems
to be a red flag for a rigged case. That is further reinforced in Airco by
the fact that the discharged employee, and not the union, filed the unfair
labor practice charge. It is possible, however, that Airco was not rigged
but rather was a simple case of incompetence or inadvertence on the part
of the union and its counsel in failing to raise the discriminatory discharge
issue.
The dissent by Kennedy follows his analysis in National Radio,
deferring to the results of arbitration whether or not the parties fully
litigated every question in that forum:
If the parties here, having chosen to have the basic issue of the
justness of the discharge determined by an arbitrator, failed
adequately to present as thorough a case as could have been
developed on the issue of discrimination, it was not for want of
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEmY OF ARBrrRATORS 29 (G. Somers & B. Dennis eds. 1970).
Meltzer, .upra note 157.
251. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
252. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1970) (union restraint or coercion of employer
in selection of representatives made an unfair labor practice).
253. Id. § 158(b) (2) (union causing employer to violate § 8(a) (3) made an un-
fair labor practice). See also note 137 supra.
254. Id. § 158(b) (3) (union refusal to bargain collectively made an unfair labor
practice).
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a proper forum in which such issue could, and should, have been
raised." 5
A strict "no interference rule" raises a problem since the parties who de-
velop and present cases in arbitration may lack the legal expertise to dis-
cover, research and litigate statutory issues. Such a rule would result in
further lawyerization and legalization of the arbitration process which
may not be desirable.
A panel of Miller and Penello with Kennedy concurring, cited Airco
with approval and refused to defer to an award in Yourga Trucking,
I,1c. This was another § 8(a) (3) charge filed by an individual em-
ployee. The employee, who had a grievance filed on his behalf in the
morning, was fired in the early afternoon, allegedly for showing up drunk
for his truck driving job. A joint area committee had upheld the dis-
charge, leaving unanswered whether the alleged discriminatory motive
issue had been presented to the committee. Deciding to dismiss the com-
plaint on the merits, the majority refused to defer because the employer
had failed to meet its burden of proof to show that the discrimination issue
had been litigated before the committee:
We face here the further question of which party to a proceeding
under the Act must adduce proof regarding the scope of matters
presented in the arbitration proceeding. We hold that the burden
to adduce such proof rests on the party asserting that our
statutory jurisdiction to resolve the issue of discrimination
should not be exercised. s 7
In Montgomery Ward & Co.,2"' an employee was fired allegedly for
falsifying a route sheet and for taking an extra paid supper break. He
filed a grievance and an unfair labor practice charge claiming that, after
he had been vocal in a gripe meeting of employees, the manager had vowed
to get rid of him. A grievance board of two representatives of the union
and two employer representatives held a hearing and decided to rein-
state him without back pay on the condition that he withdraw the Board
charge. The employee refused the offer, and the Board refused to defer,
holding, "we are not satisfied that the statutory issue of discriminatory
discharge had been either raised or resolved in the arbitration proceed-
ing. "259
255. 195 N.L.R.B. at - , 79 L.R.R.M. at 1469.
256. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (June 26, 1972).
257. Id. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1499. Kennedy concurred in the dismissal solely
as an accommodation to the joint area committee's decision. Id. at - , 80 L.R.R.M.
at 1500.
258. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 79 L.R.R.M. 1505 (Mar. 7, 1972).
259. Id. at -, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1506.
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One recent case involved the issue whether an award is repugnant
to the Act. In Combustion Engineering, Inc.,26 a panel of Fanning, Jen-
kins and Kennedy acknowledged that an arbitrator could determine, as
a question of contract, whether a collective bargaining agreement covers
the employees at an employer's newly opened plant located eight miles
from the existing plant.261 The arbitrator conceded his task was one of
contract interpretation but found it proper to take into consideration
Board standards in determining appropriate units.262 In applying those
standards the arbitrator found the two plant units to be appropriate, with
the new plant being a "normal accretion" to the existing unit.262 How-
ever, the Board agreed with the trial examiner that the arbitrator had
relied too much on insignificant factors. Accordingly, the Board did not
defer to the award. That decision may be based on two grounds. First,
using the Spielberg criteria, the award was repugnant to the policies of
the Act since the arbitrator had misapplied the Board accretion standards.
A second basis for the decision is the policy judgment that deferral is inap-
propriate in representation cases.264
One final case, Malrite, Inc.,26 raised the issue of whether the Board
would take on the enforcement of arbitration awards. The employer re-
fused to comply with an award of an arbitrator that the company violated
the contract by assigning "combo" engineer-announcers to jobs that had
been previously performed by two separate employees. A Miller, Kennedy
and Penello majority, with the dissent of Fanning and Jenkins, deferred
to the arbitration process thereby requiring the union to initiate a § 301
court action to enforce the award:
In its formulation of the Spielberg standards the Board did not
contemplate its assumption of the functions of a tribunal for the
determination of arbitration appeals and the enforcement of ar-
bitration awards. If the Board's deference to arbitration is to be
meaningful it must encompass the entire arbitration process,
including the enforcement of arbitral awards. It appears that
the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement
of labor disputes through the arbitration process will best be
served by requiring that parties to a dispute, after electing to re-
260. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.M. 1577 (Mar. 15, 1972). See text accom-
panying notes 204-05 supra.
261. 195 N.L.R.B. at -, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1579.
262. Id. at -, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1578.
263. Id.
264. For a discussion of deferral in representation cases, see notes 200-06 supra.
265. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 80 L.R.R.M. 1593 (July 18, 1972). See text accompany-
ing notes 190-91 supra.
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sort to arbitration, proceed to the usual conclusion of that pro-
cess-judicial enforcement-rather than permitting them to in-
voke the intervention of the Board.26
REGIONAL OFFICE PROCEDUPFS
The Collyer memorandum issued by General Counsel Nash outlines
procedures the regional offices are to follow in handling cases raising de-
ferral issues."' Those procedures have the effect of increasing the amount
of work needed to investigate and make the decision whether a complaint
should issue. The memorandum envisions complete investigation of the
merits of a case before any decision is made concerning deferral to ar-
bitration:
The region should consider whether to defer action on an unfair
labor practice charge for arbitration under the Collyer policy
only after the charge has been fully investigated and after the
region has determined that . . Collyer arbitration deferral
policy aside, the charge would warrant issuance of a com-
plaint. -88
While allowing the investigation on deferral to be done concurrently
with the investigation of the merits "to avoid the duplication of effort," ' 9
this procedure adds unnecessary work. The effort put into the investiga-
tion of the merits is wasted where it is decided to defer to arbitration."'
Presumably, the argument in favor of this approach is that there can
only be deferral where there is jurisdiction and there cannot be a deter-
mination of jurisdiction without a complete investigation of the merits.
Another argument is that the regions should exercise due caution since a
decision not to issue a complaint assented to by the General Counsel is
not reviewable in court. Finally, Collyer rests its decision on the greater
expertise of arbitrators to decide contract disputes and does not speak to
considerations of efficiency. Even National Radio, which views deferral
from the broader perspective of accommodation, only considered the
factor of efficiency in terms of reducing the caseload before the Board it-
self and not the regional offices.
Nevertheless, broad considerations of efficiency, as well as a policy
to minimize NLRB interference in arbitration, suggest that regional per-
sonnel investigate and determine deferral questions before investigating
266. 195 N.L.R.B. at -, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1594.
267. Collyer memorandum, supra note 7.
268. Id. at 15,022.
269. Id.
270. Of course, the results of an investigation would be useful should the decision
be made to reassert jurisdiction. However, that would be an inefficient use of investiga-
tive resources should the number of reopened cases be small.
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the merits of the charge.27' The model implicitly suggested in the cases
following Collyer is the procedural framework used by courts in § 301
suits. The first step would be to determine the existence of a binding
contract between union and management. The second step is to determine
whether the claim, on its face, is governed by the collective bargaining
agreement, viewing that agreement as an organic or constitutional docu-
ment. The third step is to determine whether the dispute is arbitrable
under a strong presumption of arbitrability, leaving the ultimate deter-
mination of arbitrability, to the arbitrator. Grafted on to the court tests
would have to be further steps to conform with Board decisions. One such
step would be inquiry into the nature of the conflict resolution system
to determine if it should be accorded the status of arbitration. Another
question to be answered is whether the dispute concerned an area of
the Board's primary jurisdiction where it would not defer, such as re-
presentation issues. A third question would be whether deferral should be
applied where there existed a substantial conflict of interest between the
union and the aggrieved employee. In the post award situation, the Spiel-
berg criteria7 2 could continue to form the procedural framework.
CONCLUSION
The hypothesis upon beginning the research for this paper was that
deferral was a bad idea because it would further insulate union-manage-
ment actions in the collective bargaining contract from challenge by em-
ployees. That hypothesis has not been sustained for several reasons. The
system of concurrent jurisdiction did not do a very sensitive job of
handling employee claims against union and management. Further, the
ever increasing crunch of expanding caseload and limited resources re-
stricts the number of cases the Board as an agency can competently handle.
Thus, the NLRB cannot afford the luxury of providing duplicate forums
used mostly to achieve strategic ends by parties to collective bargaining
disputes.
Overall, the development of deferral has been encouraging since it
has proceeded rather consistently and rationally. The most encouraging
part has been the sensitivity of the Board to the protection of statutory
claims of employees in adopting its substantial harmony rule and in the
application of its criteria in reviewing awards. In sum, the abstention,
rational accommodation language of National Radio provides a better
basis to discuss the issues appropriate to a rational development of the
deferral policy than does the language of the Collyer opinion.
271. Such a procedure would result in more cases being dismissed with a retention
of jurisdiction since claims that are eligible for deferral but otherwise without merit
would be included. A motion to reopen because arbitration did not result or was de-
ficient would trigger an investigation of the merits and permit a dismissal by the region.
272. See notes 244-45 supra & text accompanying.
